The Quiet Period in a Noisy World: Rethinking Securities Regulation and Corporate Free Speech by Heyman, Susan B.
The Quiet Period in a Noisy World: Rethinking
Securities Regulation and Corporate Free Speech
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In the name of investor protection, the Securities and Exchange Commission's
"Quiet Period Rules" essentially prohibit the dissemination of both truthful
and misleading speech outside of the statutory prospectus filed with the
Commission. While the Quiet Period Rules might have served a function when
originally adopted in the 1930s, they rely on empirical assumptions about the
availability of information and investor behavior that are no longer accurate.
Today, if Groupon or Facebook predicts, during the offering process, that it
will be "wildly profitable, " a plethora of news outlets and analysts stands
ready to pick the statement apart. Allowing offering participants to
communicate truthful information during the offering process would not have
an adverse impact on investors. Instead, the efficient capital market hypothesis
suggests that more information would have a positive impact, as sophisticated
investors would quickly assimilate that information into the price of the
securities.
The Quiet Period Rules are also problematic from a First Amendment
perspective. The Supreme Court has recently held that speech restrictions
cannot be justified simply because they apply to a heavily regulated area, such
as securities. If challenged under the commercial speech doctrine, the broad
prophylactic restrictions on the scope and timing ofpromotional activity in the
capital markets would unlikely withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Further, if
Quiet Period Rules are ultimately subject to strict scrutiny review under the
robust articulation of corporate political speech rights in Citizens United v.
FEC, the restrictions would have virtually no chance ofsurviving.
The SEC can craft regulations to protect investors against false or misleading
statements while still respecting corporate speech rights and efficiency in
capital markets. One approach is to narrow the definition of the term "offer"
to permit communications that may "condition the market" so long as those
communications do not propose a current exchange of securities. Allowing a
more open dialogue about the value of securities would not only abate free
speech concerns, but also increase market efficiency. Investors would still be
protected against false or misleading speech under the anti-fraud provisions of
the Securities Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Immediately after Groupon decided to launch an initial public offering
(IPO) and file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC), the media began to critique the company's business
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model and accounting practices.1 Because of the rules prohibiting an issuer or
related party from making written offers outside of the statutory prospectus2
under the Securities Act (the Quiet Period Rules), Groupon was limited in its
potential responses. 3 Despite these restrictions, Groupon's Chief Executive
Officer, Andrew Mason, sent a mass e-mail to thousands of Groupon employees
depicting Groupon's mistreatment by the press and presenting financial
information not included in the statutory prospectus. The media obtained a copy
of the e-mail and published the memo within hours of its internal distribution.4
The memo provided in part:
[Tihe degree to which we're getting the [expletive] kicked out of us in the
press had finally crossed the threshold from "annoying" to "hilarious." . . . I'll
summarize my excitement with four points: [(] 1) Growth in our core business
is strong[,] [(]2) Our investments in the future ... look great, [(]3) We are
pulling away from competition, and [(]4) We've built a great team that I would
pit against anyone. In other words, all the stuff that one would want to look
good? It looks good.5
A few days later, during an interview with Bloomberg, Eric Lefkofsky,
chairman, co-founder and dominant shareholder of Groupon, defended his
company by predicting that it would be "wildly profitable."6
The SEC took notice of Mason's e-mail and Lefkofsky's statement because
they may have violated the Quiet Period Rules. These seemingly benign
communications which did not include the term "offer" may nonetheless have
been construed as an unlawful offer if the SEC determined that it "condition[ed]
the public mind or arous[ed] interest" in the offering.7 Presumably in response
1 An IPO is the issuer's original sale of a security to the investing public. This initial
offering occurs in what is known as the primary market. The secondary market, by contrast,
is the market in which buyers and sellers trade the security after the initial stage. Examples
of secondary markets are The New York Stock Exchange and over-the-counter markets.
2 A statutory prospectus, sometimes referred to as a Section 10 prospectus, refers to
the prospectus filed with the SEC and consists of the first section of the registration
statement. See Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006).
3 See infra Part I for a description of these restrictions.
4 See Brad Allen, Leaked Memo Leads to Groupon PR Head Exit, INSIDER INVESTOR
RELATIONS (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/stock-
exchanges-listings/1 8452/leaked-memo-leads-groupon-pr-head-exit.
5 Kara Swisher, Exclusive: Groupon's Mason Tells Troops in Fiesty Internal Memo:
"It Looks Good", ALL THINGs D (Aug. 25, 2011, 3:02 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20110825/
exclusive-groupons-mason-tells-troops-in-feisty-intemal-memo-it-looks-good.
6 Corey Johnson, Douglas MacMillan & Brian Womack, Groupon Chairman Remarks
May Require Company to Make New Filing, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (June 7, 2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-07/groupon-chairman-remarks-may-require-
company-to-make-new-filing.html.
7 Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman of the SEC, to Darrell E. Issa, Chairman of
the Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 6, 2011)
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to pressure from regulators, Groupon amended its statutory prospectus to
address statements made in the controversial e-mail and interview.8
Specifically, the company added a risk factor advising prospective investors to
disregard Lefkofsky's statement and instead to rely only on the information
contained in the prospectus in determining whether to purchase shares. 9 After a
number of other mishaps related to the offering and the company's accounting
practices and valuation, Groupon voluntarily postponed its IPO for several
months.' 0
Groupon is not alone in taking SEC heat for communications made during
the registration process. Back in 2004, Salesforce.com was forced to delay its
IPO after cooperating with a New York Times profile of the company and its
founder, Marc Benioff.1l Just a few months later, SEC scrutinized Google for
an interview Playboy had published after Google had filed its registration
statement. During the interview, the founders of Google made several routine
comments, including "We think we're an important company, and we're
dedicated to doing this over the long term. We like being independent."' 2 in
2006, Go Daddy filed a registration statement for its IPO and withdrew it less
than three months later. One of the stated reasons for the withdrawal was the
concern expressed by Bob Parson, Go Daddy's CEO, that the offering rules
imposed restrictions on his ability to conduct his weekly radio show.' 3
[hereinafter Schapiro Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro-issa-
letter-04061 1.pdf.8 Groupon, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 10,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911007178
/a2204399zs-la.htm. The statutory prospectus filed with the SEC includes comprehensive
balanced information about the issuer and the offering that facilitates investment decisions.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006).
9 Groupon, Inc., supra note 8. See generally DAvID A. WESTENBERG, INTIAL PUBLIC
OFFERINGS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO GOING PUBLIC § 11.3 (Practising Law Institute 2011).
10Alan J. Berkeley & Alissa A. Parisi, Communications During the "Offering
Process" and Securities Offering Reform by SEC, ALI-ABA 99 (Mar. 15-17, 2012); see
also Steven M. Davidoff, In a Quiet Period, Groupon Feels the Noise, DEALBK (Sept. 2,
2011, 9:03 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/in-a-quiet-period-groupon-feels-
the-noise/.
11 Michael Liedtke, Salesforce.com IPO Postponed Due to Too Much Publicity,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 5, 2004), available at http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/
20040605/newslb5ipo.html.
12Google, Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 18,
2004), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dl4D5a.148c8.htm#1stPage. Regulators forced
Google to attach a copy of the article to its prospectus to clarify a few numbers and remind
potential investors of certain risks.
13 See Bob Parsons, Go Daddy Pulls Its IPO Filing! Why I Decided to Pull It, BOB
PARSONS.ME (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.bobparsons.me/121/godaddy-pulls-ipo-filing-why-
decided-pull.html; see also Jonathan Berr, Go Daddy Yanks IPO, STREET (Aug. 9, 2006,
10:27 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10302695/1/go-daddy-yanks-ipo.html; Matt
Krantz, IPO Indigestion Grows as Go Daddy Balks, USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2006, 3:34 AM),
http://usatoday3O.usatoday.com/money/markets/us/2006-08-09-ipo-usat-x.htm.
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The theory behind the Quiet Period Rules was that investors should make
investment decisions based on the full disclosures contained in the prospectus,
rather than on information disseminated by the company but not reviewed by
the SEC. 14 The concern was that the attention of investors would stray from the
calibrated information contained in the prospectus to other more "glossy"
documents if given the opportunity.15 These prophylactic restrictions on speech
may have been necessary when they were originally adopted in the 1930s, just
after the invention of television and decades before the advent of personal
computers and the Internet. 16 At that time, favorable information disseminated
by issuers may have unduly influenced investors. Today there is infinitely more
information available about a company or an offering and many other checks on
statements made by offering participants. There are dedicated cable business
channels and thousands of business blogs.17 Any investor looking for critical
information on a company can do a quick Google search and find it. A wider
range of financial instruments is now available so that investors receive more
balanced information about a company. If a company like Groupon says it's
going to be wildly profitable and it's not, there are plenty of news outlets and
analysts that will pick the statement apart. Allowing issuers to communicate
during the offering period would not have an adverse impact on investors.
Instead, given the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH), the impact
would be positive: more information is beneficial, and sophisticated investors
would quickly assimilate that information into the price.' 8
In recognition of the technological advances and to allow more information
to reach investors, the SEC liberalized the offering rules in 2005 (the 2005
Securities Offering Reforms). 19 While seemingly making it easier for
information to reach investors, these reforms meaningfully change the Quiet
Period Rules only with respect to a certain class of issuers-well-known
seasoned issuers (WKSIs).20 For companies not required to file reports with the
SEC, the reforms essentially preserve the traditional framework.
14 See Securities Offering Reform, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,731 (Aug. 3, 2005).
I5 John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate Over
Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1143, 1151 (1995).
16 It is estimated that in 1993, the Internet carried only 1% of the information flowing
through two-way telecommunication. By 2000 this figure had grown to 51%, and by 2007
more than 97% of all telecommunicated information was carried over the Internet. See
Martin Hilbert & Priscila L6pez, The World's Technological Capacity to Store,
Communicate, and Compute Information, SCIENCE, 60-65 (Apr. 2011).
I7 See id.
18 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the efficient capital market hypothesis.
19 See infra Part II.B for a description of the 2005 Securities Offering Reforms.20 The SEC created four categories of issuers-non-reporting, unseasoned, seasoned,
and well-seasoned. All issuers, except non-reporting issuers, are required to file reports with
the SEC. Those issuers who do not meet the requirements of Form S-3 are referred to as
"unseasoned issuers," and those who meet those requirements are "seasoned issuers."
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Further, President Barack Obama recently signed the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), which substantially changes a number of
laws and regulations in a way that is expected to facilitate the offering process
and make it easier for companies to go public.2 1 The JOBS Act requires the
SEC to ease some of the solicitation restrictions for companies launching a
public offering with total annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion, referred
to as emerging growth companies (EGCs).22 An additional liberalization for
private offerings made only to accredited investors is that the SEC must permit
"general solicitation or general advertising."23 This change will not affect the
rules governing public offerings.
Despite these reforms, quiet period concerns have continued to plague
corporations launching public offerings as demonstrated by Groupon's IPO in
2011.24 The antiquated investor-protection rules defy common sense, protecting
mostly institutional investors and keeping other investors in the dark. As Dan
Primack, a prominent journalist commented:
It's time for the SEC to let companies communicate more freely with
everyone, not just the chosen few. Today's investors have easy access to all
sorts of information-including SEC filings-and are unlikely to be suckered
by just a few optimistic syllables uttered to a reporter. It's too loud a world to
keep these companies so quiet.25
In addition to normative and economic challenges, the Quiet Period Rules
raise corporate free speech concerns. In 2011, Congress' Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform raised First Amendment concerns over
some of the offering restrictions to the SEC.26 Rather than substantively
Seasoned issuers who also have an equity market float of $700 million are referred to as
"well-seasoned issuers." See Securities Act of 1933 Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012).
21 Andrew L. Fabens, Glenn R. Pollner, Blaise F. Brennan, Nicolas H.R. Dumont &
Kulbir S. Walha, JOBS Act Changes the Public & Private Capital Markets Landscape, 16
No. 5 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 12, 12 (2012).
22 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions, SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
guidance/cfjjobsactfaq-title-i-general.htm (setting forth the revenue test for determining
whether a company meets the requirements for an emerging growth company).
23 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. § 201(a) (2012). The
text as of April 6, 2012 is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-1 12hr3606enr/
pdf/BILLS-l l2hr3606enr.pdf.
24 Lynn Cowan, In The 'Quiet Period, 'Mum's Still The Word-New Leeway to Talk of
IPOs'Prospects Gains Few Takers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2007, at C6.
25 Dan Primack, It's Time to Kill the IPO Quiet Period, CNNMONEY (Sept. 6, 2011,
5:00 AM), http://fmance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/09/06/its-time-to-kill-the-ipo-quiet-period;
see also Jesse Eisinger, 'Quiet Period' Ahead of IPOs Needs to End, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
2004, at Cl (recommending that the SEC abandon the Quiet Period Rules).
26 Letter from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman of the Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform,
U.S. House of Representatives, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman of the SEC (Mar. 22, 2011)
(on file with author).
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responding to the inquiries, the SEC merely reported that it had not yet had
"occasion to consider the constitutionality of the quiet period rules under the
First Amendment."27 However, the time is ripe for a serious exploration of the
Quiet Period Rules. The Court has recently held that speech restrictions cannot
be justified simply because they apply in a heavily regulated area, such as
securities laws.28 Further, it is increasingly likely after the Court's robust
articulation of corporate political speech rights in Citizens United v. FEC,29 that
a First Amendment challenge to the antiquated restrictions on corporate speech
will be brought.3 0 If challenged under the commercial speech doctrine, the
broad prophylactic restrictions on both truthful and misleading speech for the
purpose of protecting those who would hear the speech would not likely
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.3 1 Further, if Quiet Period Rules are
ultimately subject to strict scrutiny review under the political speech doctrine,
the restrictions would have virtually no chance of surviving.
While scholars, commentators, and practitioners have long debated whether
securities regulations generally should be subject to constitutional review, there
has been relatively little focus on the constitutionality of the Quiet Period Rules
specifically. This Article will demonstrate that the Quiet Period Rules are
problematic not only from normative and economic perspectives, but from a
constitutional law perspective.
Part II describes the original offering rules under the Securities Act, the
2005 Securities Offering Reforms, and the amendments required by the JOBS
Act. This Article focuses primarily on non-reporting issuers because if the
regulations should be liberalized with respect to these issuers, then they should
clearly be liberalized with respect to the other categories of reporting issuers.
Part III demonstrates that the offering restrictions rest on empirical assumptions
about the availability of information and investor behavior that are no longer
accurate. Parts IV and V demonstrate that the Quiet Period Rules raise
constitutional corporate free speech concerns, under the commercial speech and
political speech doctrines, respectively. Part VI then proposes several reforms to
the rules that would resolve the economic, normative and constitutional
problems within the current landscape, including narrowing the definition of the
27 Schapiro Letter, supra note 7, at 7.
2 8 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502-04 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (suggesting that speech restrictions cannot be justified solely because the speech
relates to activities that the government can regulate).
29558 U.S. 310 (2010).
30 First Amendment cases have recently been brought in Massachusetts challenging
state regulations on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Bulldog Investors Gen. P'ship v.
Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 953 N.E.2d 691, 694-95 (Mass. 2011) (holding that restriction
on hedge fund satisfied the Central Hudson test and was not a violation of the fund's free
speech rights).
31 Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT.
EcoN. REv. 95, 96 (1995) (arguing that some aspects of mandatory prospectus regulation
raise serious First Amendment concerns).
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term "offer" or expanding the safe harbors created by the 2005 Securities
Offering Reforms and the JOBS Act.
II. QUIET PERIOD RULES FOR PUBLIC OFFERINGS
A. Quiet Period Rules Under the Securities Act
The Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) does not directly regulate
speech or communications, but instead, regulates the making of offers under
Section 5. These regulations are different during three distinct phases of the
registration process. 32 During the thirty days prior to filing a registration
statement (the pre-filing period) securities may not be offered.33 During the
period between the filing of a registration statement and when the SEC declares
the statement effective (the waiting period) an issuer can make oral offers, but
cannot make written offers other than by means of the statutory prospectus. 34
The broad definition of offer limits the ability of the issuer or related parties to
disseminate written or broadcast offers other than by means of the filed
statutory prospectus. 35 After effectiveness which usually occurs shortly after the
offering is priced and public trading begins (the post-effective period) an issuer
may sell and deliver securities as long as the filed prospectus accompanies or
proceeds delivery of the securities. 36 However, a newly public company and its
affiliated underwriters may not issue earnings forecasts and research reports for
32 See Quiet Period, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/quiet.htm. A registered offering refers to an offering that is
registered under Section 5 of the Securities Act, unlike a private placement which is exempt
from registration.
33 Under Section 5(c),
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus
or otherwise any security . .. prior to the effective date of the registration
statement ....
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c)(2006).
34 Section 5(b)(1) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any
security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this
subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 77j . ...
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2006).
35 The Act defines prospectuses to include written communications as well as broadcast
communications, such as TV and radio transmissions, that offer securities for sale. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10).
36 Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2).
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a specified period of time following an IPO.37 This Article focuses on the
restrictions on speech prohibiting issuers, and related parties, including
underwriters38 and dealers from making "offers" outside of the statutory
prospectus during the pre-filing and waiting periods. A violation of these rules
is often referred to as "gun-jumping" and subjects the speaker to civil and
possibly criminal consequences. 39
The problem is that the SEC has construed the Securities Act's definition of
"offer" broadly. The Securities Act defined an "offer" to include "every attempt
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security, for value." 40 However, the SEC has explained that the term "offer"
goes "well beyond, the common law concept of offer"41 and includes
everything that "condition[s] the public mind or arouse[s] public interest in the
particular securities." 42 A communication releasing favorable information about
the issuer to increase general awareness would not by itself constitute an offer.
However, this information can become an offer when the issuer is in registration
as almost any favorable information about an issuer may condition the market.43
For this reason, the SEC cautions issuers and other offering participants that in
the absence of a particular exemption, communications should be restricted
during the quiet period.44
Such advice is prudent considering an offering participant may be liable for
a Section 5 violation even if the disseminated information is not false or
misleading and even if there is no proof of causation or damages.45 The intent of
37 In July of 2002, this post-effective quiet period was extended from twenty-five to
forty calendar days as part of the global settlement between the SEC and ten large securities
firms. See Daniel J. Bradley, Jay R. Ritter, Bradford D. Jordan & Jack G. Wolf, The IPO
Quiet Period Revisited, 2 J. INv. MGMT, no. 3, 2004, at 3.
38 The term "underwriter" is defined broadly under the Securities Act to include
any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct
or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in
the direct or indirect underwriting of any such underwriting.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1 1) (2006).
39 A violator may be civilly liable under Section 12(a) of the Securities Act regardless
of intent, see Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c), and may be criminally
liable for a willful violation under Section 24 of the Securities Act, see Securities Act of
1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77yyy.
40 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).
41 Schapiro Letter, supra note 7, at 2-3.421n re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, Fed. Reg.
76,635 (Feb. 9, 1959).
43 Tal-Cap, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 3844 (Dec. 6, 1963) (reiterating
the Commission's position that an offer is to be broadly defined).
44 See Schapiro Letter, supra note 7, at 3.
45 Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem ofExtraneous Offers of Securities,
50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 457, 466 (1989); see also Tal-Cap, Inc., Investment Company Act
Release No. 3844 (Dec. 6, 1963).
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the issuer or other offering participant is not relevant. In fact, the Second Circuit
has held that a violation of the offering rules is actionable even where the issuer
ultimately complies with the statute by delivering the prospectus before the sale
is consummated. 46 As the Court reasoned, "an offeror of a security who had
failed to follow one of the allowed paths [can] not achieve absolution simply by
returning to the road of virtue before receiving payment."47 Further, a defendant
may be liable without proof of causation between the violation and the
damages, and even where the defendant can demonstrate that other
circumstances caused the losses.48
Further, a number of sanctions may be invoked against an offering
participant who violates the gun-jumping rules.49 The SEC may impose a
"cooling-off period" by forcing the company to delay the IPO for a period of
time determined by the SEC. Given market volatility, a cooling-off period may
jeopardize an IPO. The company may also be required to include a "rescission
risk disclosure" in its registration statement acknowledging that the company
could be required to repurchase the shares sold in the IPO at the original
offering price for a period of one year following the date of the violation.o
Alternatively, the company may be required to file the statements made in
violation of the quiet period restrictions as part of its registration statement and
include a risk factor explaining why the statements are or may be inaccurate.
This disclosure can be embarrassing and may require the prospectus to disclose
projections or other forward-looking information that would not otherwise be
included and that may expose the company to additional liability. Finally, the
SEC can seek monetary penalties against a company and its directors and
officers, or seek the imposition of a cease-and-desist order against future
violations.51
Although the SEC may not bring actions on behalf of individual investors,
several anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act allow individual investors to
bring civil actions against issuers, underwriters and other offering participants
for false or misleading statements. 52 Specifically, Section 11 imposes liability
on issuers and underwriters for registration statements that contain "an untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact required . .. to make
46 See Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Very likely
Congress thought a better time for meaningful prospectus reading was at the time of the
offer rather than in the context of confirmation and demand for payment.").
47Id at 876.
48 See id.
49 WESTENBERG, supra note 9, § 11:3.2.
50See id. § 11:3.
51 See id.
52 Section 15 aids investors by making "control persons," or persons who "control"
defendants liable under Sections 11 and 12 by owning stock or under agency principles,
jointly and severally liable. This helps investors collect damages in cases where the
defendant is insolvent or does not have enough money to pay the investor, a frequent
situation in securities litigation. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C § 77k(f) (2006).
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the statements contained therein not misleading."53 Similarly, Section 12(a)(2)
creates liability for any person who offers or sells a security through a
prospectus or an oral communication containing a material misstatement or
omission.54 Section 17(a) is a catchall provision, which imposes liability for
fraudulent sales of securities. 55
B. The 2005 Securities Offering Reforms Only Nominally Benefit Non-
Reporting Issuers56
Although the SEC adopted the 2005 Securities Offering Reforms to update
and liberalize offering activity and communications, these amended rules
retained many aspects of the quiet period restrictions for non-reporting
companies.57 Several exemptions were created only for WKSIs and other
reporting issuers, including the ability to make offers in the pre-filing period5 s
and to continue to release business information and forward-looking
53 A purchaser may bring a claim under Section 11, even if he bought the security after
the initial offering on the secondary markets. A purchaser can sue so long as the purchaser
can trace the purchase back to the initial offering and is within the statute of limitations-
there is no need to prove causation or reliance on the misstatements or omissions. Damages
are limited to the difference between the offering price and value of the securities at the time
of the lawsuit. Although the purchaser can sue the issuer, underwriter, or subsequent seller,
all defendants but the issuer have a "due diligence" defense that they had no grounds to
believe the statement contained a misstatement or omission. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15
U.S.C. § 77(k)(e) (2000).
54Under Section 12(a)(2), a seller is liable to the purchaser for rescission of the
purchase or damages, provided that the purchaser did not know about the misstatement or
omission at the time of the purchase. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(2)
(2000).
55 Section 17(a) makes it unlawful to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud," "obtain money or property" by using material misstatements or omissions, or to
"engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(2006). This provision is closely tracked by Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
and Rule lOb-5, which is used more widely by investors suing for fraud. Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
56 The SEC also adopted several earlier reforms. As an example, in 1970, the SEC
adopted a safe-harbor exemption to clarify that continued analyst research coverage does not
constitute an unlawful offer. Publication of Information and Delivery of Prospectus by
Broker-Dealers Prior to or After the Filing of a Registration Statement Under the Securities
Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 33-5101, Fed. Reg. 18,456 (Dec. 3, 1970).
57 Securities Offering Reform, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005).
58 Well-known seasoned issuers can make any written or oral communications prior to
an offering of their securities. These issuers are also permitted to make offers of securities




statements. 59 Other exemptions apply to all issuers, but have not significantly
altered communications made by non-reporting companies or related parties
during the offering process. 60 Except for the free writing prospectus rule, these
exemptions appear to have been adopted to assure issuers that communications
completely unrelated to the offering would not be deemed gun-jumping
violations.
For instance, the SEC created a bright-line safe harbor for communications
made by eligible issuers more than thirty days before the filing of a registration
statement. Under this broad exemption, communications will not be deemed
"offers" so long as they are made by or on behalf of the issuer, do not reference
the securities offering and the issuer takes reasonable steps to prevent the
information from being further distributed during the offering period.61 The
purpose for this liberalization was to avoid unnecessary limitations on
communications by issuers prior to its registered offering.62
Similarly, the SEC created a rule to enable companies to continue to
disseminate regularly released, ordinary-course information during the
registration process without running afoul of the gun-jumping restrictions.63
This safe harbor applies to communications that involve factual business
information about the company or its services or products, that is regularly
released and intended for use by persons other than in their capacity as investors
or potential investors (such as customers, suppliers and business partners). 4
This rule does not cover forward-looking statements.65 Accordingly, non-
reporting issuers should not issue or disclose any forecasts, projections, or
predictions relating to the company's financial performance or its value, even if
the release of this information was part of the company's prior practice.66
Additionally, a company may not increase the use of advertisements, even
advertisements for its products unrelated to the offering. 67
Unlike the thirty-day and ordinary business safe harbors, the rule permitting
the use of free writing prospectuses seemingly allows issuers and related parties
59 All reporting issuers are permitted to continue to publish regularly released factual
business information and forward-looking information. Securities Act of 1933 Rule 168, 17
C.F.R. § 230.168 (2012).
60 See Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 85, 90 (2006).
61 Securities Act of 1933 Rule 163A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A (2012).
62Id
63 Securities Act of 1933 Rule 169, 17 C.F.R. § 230.169 (2012). Rule 169 applies to
Non-Exchange Act reporting issuers; there is an analogous safe harbor for Exchange Act
Reporting Companies under Securities Act Rule 168. See Securities Act of 1933 Rule 168,
17 C.F.R. § 230.168(a)(1) (2012).
64 Securities Act of 1933 Rule 169, 17 C.F.R. § 230.169 (2012).
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 Securities Act of 1933 Rule 134(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134a (2012) (exempting
tombstone ads from the definition of prospectus).
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to make written offers outside of the statutory prospectus.6 ' Because of several
limitations, however, this rule has not dramatically altered communications of
non-reporting issuers during the offering period. In general, prior to using a free
writing prospectus in an IPO, the issuer must file a preliminary prospectus
containing an estimated offering price range with the SEC, 69 the free writing
prospectus must be preceded or accompanied by the most recent statutory
prospectus, 70 and the free writing prospectus must include a detailed legend.7'
The prospectus delivery requirement makes the use of broadly disseminated
free writing prospectuses infeasible unless they are in electronic form and
contain an active hyperlink to the preliminary prospectus.72 Although practices
with respect to the use of free writing prospectuses by issuers or other offering
participants are still evolving, it appears that the exception is largely relied on to
update or correct offering terms during the offering process "without the delay,
inconvenience, expense, or potential stigma often associated with recirculating a
revised . . . prospectus." 73
To encourage the media as a communicator of valuable information, the
SEC generally treats a media publication based on information provided by an
issuer or underwriter as a "media free writing prospectus." 74 The only
68 Securities Act of 1933 Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012). Free writing
prospectuses include, in certain circumstances, e-mails, faxes, and pre-recorded electronics
communications. See Securities Act of 1933 Rules 163, 164 and 433, 17 C.F.R. §§ 163, 164,
and 433.
69 Securities Act of 1933 Rule 433(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(b)(2) (2012). The price
range requirement results in a delay in the use of free writing prospectuses in the waiting
period until the issuer sets a price range for the offering.
70 Id.
7 1Id. The legend must contain substantially the following information:
The issuer has filed a registration statement (including a prospectus) with the SEC for
the offering to which this communication relates. Before you invest, you should read
the prospectus in that registration statement and other documents the issuer has filed
with the SEC for more complete information about the issuer and this offering. You
may get these documents for free by visiting EDGAR on the SEC Web site at
www.sec.gov. Alternatively, the issuer, any underwriter or any dealer participating in
the offering will arrange to send you the prospectus if you request it ....
17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c)(2)(i) (2012).
72Peter M. Astiz, Publicity and Gun-Jumping, in ADVANCED VENTURE CAPITAL 2011,
at 391, 400 (Curtis L. Mo. & Jason Doren eds., 2011).
73 WESTENBERG, supra note 9, § 18:3, at 18-9. Free writing prospectuses can be used to
update deal-related information (e.g., revising the intended use of proceeds), to convey IPO
pricing information (e.g., share price or underwriting discount), or to disclose material
company developments (e.g., the commencement of litigation, financial data for a recently
completed period). See id. at 18-12.
74 A "media free writing prospectus" is a publication where an issuer or other offering
participant provides information about the issuer or offering, to a member or the media, and
the publication of that information is an offer by the issuer or underwriter. See Securities
Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,756-59 (Aug. 3,
2005).
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requirements for using this exception are that the publication or broadcast
include a detailed legend75 and be filed with the SEC within four business days
after the issuer or underwriter is aware of its dissemination. On the other hand,
the requirements for using an affiliated media free writing prospectus77 are
almost impossible to meet for IPOs.78 As a result, in an IPO, the issuer and
underwriters may not prepare or pay for the release of information about the
issuer, its securities, or the offering. A reporter criticized this media exemption
as being "largely cosmetic" as companies were permitted to talk to the media,
but only if their statements tracked almost exactly with the offering
documents.79 Similarly, to encourage the publication of research reports which
provide valuable information, the SEC adopted rule amendments that expand
the scope of safe harbors for such reports during the quiet period.
While seemingly liberalizing the offering rules, the 2005 Securities
Offering Reforms left significant restrictions on permitted communications of
non-reporting issuers intact, as exemplified by the Groupon IPO. Despite these
reforms, during the offering period, issuer and related party communications
"should not include opinions about the value of the company and should not
mention the proposed public offering.. .. Predictions of increased earnings,
market share or expected industry growth should be strictly avoided." 8' "Any
planned press releases, advertising campaigns, news articles, interviews,
speeches, industry conferences should be monitored closely and reviewed prior
to release." 82 These types of communications, containing comments of
corporate insiders, "mentioning the offering, or discussing the company's
business prospects, could be interpreted" as gun-jumping violations even if the
communications are completely accurate.83
. 75 The detailed legend must recommend that investors read the statutory prospectus and
other filed documents on the SEC website and provide notice that investors can have a
prospectus sent to them. See supra note 71.
76 Securities Act of 1933 Rules 164, 433(f), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.164, 230.433(f) (2012).
77 An affiliated free writing prospectus exists when the issuer or underwriter prepares
or pays for the preparation, publication, or dissemination of or uses or refers to a published
article, television or radio broadcast, or advertisement. See Securities Offering Reform,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,757 (Aug. 3, 2005).
78 If the issuer is a non-reporting or unseasoned issuer, a free writing prospectus must
be accompanied by or preceded by the most recent statutory prospectus. The delivery
requirements are less burdensome for seasoned and well-known seasoned issuers. The issuer
or underwriter must also file the publication by the date of its first use. Id. at 44,785.
79 Primack, supra note 25, at 2 ("When I have conversations with CEOs who want to
make public statements, I first want to know if they're trying to sell their product, which is
allowed, or if they're really trying to sell their company, which isn't." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
80 See Securities Act of 1933 Rules 137, 138, and 139, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.137-.139
(2005).
81 Laird H. Simons 111, Publicity Before and After Filing an IPO Registration
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C. The JOBS Act Exception Permitting "Test the Water"
Communications Only Benefits Emergent Growth Companies
In 2012, the JOBS Act created an exception to permit certain non-reporting
companies to "test the water" prior to or following the filing of a registration
statement. This exception is only available to companies with less than $1
billion in annual gross revenues, referred to as emergent growth companies
(EGCs). Specifically, EGCs or persons acting on their behalf, including
underwriters, are permitted to communicate orally or in writing to qualified
institutional buyers (QIBs) 8 4 or institutions that are accredited investors85 "to
determine whether such investors might have an interest in the contemplated
securities offering."86 In the absence of this amendment, such communications
would constitute impermissible offers to sell or solicitations of offers to buy
securities under Section 5(c). This is a significant change that should greatly
facilitate the ability of EGCs and their underwriters to "test the water" to gauge
potential investor interest in advance of a public offering. This exception does
not alter the restrictions on larger issuers, with more than $1 billion in annual
gross revenues to communicate with potential investors.
Although the SEC recognized the problems inherent in restricting speech in
the weeks before an offering when it adopted the 2005 Securities Offering
Reforms and the JOBS Act,87 those reforms failed to meaningfully alter the way
many non-reporting companies conduct IPOs. The current rules still "deprive
investors of information ... and limit a company's ability to respond to
misinformation in the media."88
84A qualified institutional buyer is a purchaser of securities that is deemed financially
sophisticated and is legally recognized by security market regulators to need less protection
from issuers than most public investors. Rule 144A requires an institution to manage at least
$100 million in securities from issuers not affiliated with the institution to be considered a
QIB. Securities Act of 1933 Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(iv) (2006).
85 An accredited investor is an investor permitted to invest in certain types of higher
risk investments including private placements. Section 501 of Regulation D defines the term
to include banks, insurance companies, registered investment companies, and natural
persons with individual or joint net worth (with spouse) in excess of $1 million. Securities
Act of 1933 Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2006).
86 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation § 85 (2012).
87 Securities Offering Reform, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005). The stated purpose of the 2005 Securities Offering Reform
was to
modify and advance significantly the registration, communications, and offering
processes . . .. [The new] rules will eliminate unnecessary and outmoded restrictions on
offerings. In addition, the rules will provide more timely investment information to
investors without mandating delays in the offering process that we believe would be
inconsistent with the needs of issuers for timely access to capital. The rules also will
continue our long-term efforts toward integrating disclosure and processes . . ..
Id.
8 8 Eisenger, supra note 25, at Cl.
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III. THE SHAKY FOUNDATION OF THE QUIET PERIOD RULES
Two primary objectives of the SEC are to obtain efficient capital markets 89
and promote investor confidence in those markets. 90 Despite the SEC's
concerns, additional information provided by issuers during the offering process
would not send investors into a speculative frenzy or otherwise have an adverse
impact on investors. Instead, given the ECMH, the impact would be positive:
the public availability of additional accurate information would be beneficial to
rational investors. Further, even if many investors are not rational, they would
be protected against misinterpreting optimistic statements as the price of the
securities would accurately reflect all public information. Although the ECMH
is not as compelling for IPOs as it is for secondary offerings with more analyst
coverage, IPO markets are sufficiently information efficient that the public
availability of additional information would benefit investors.
A. Rational Investors Will Not Go into a Speculative Frenzy
The SEC restricts speech during the offering process primarily to prevent
investors from going into a "speculative frenzy" based on optimistic
information about the issuer.91 Investors may be unjustly persuaded to purchase
securities if presented with information that promotes the issuer, even if no
mention is made of the offering. 92 The offering rules were designed to protect
investors from being exposed to the wrong type of information before they have
the benefit of reviewing the statutory prospectus containing appropriately
calibrated information. The concern is that attention of investors will stray away
from the balanced information in the statutory prospectus to other more "flashy"
documents if given the opportunity. 93
However, rational investors do not need these protections as they will likely
discount less reliable information (e.g., the "flashy" documents) and place
greater weight on more reliable information (e.g., the statutory prospectus).
These investors would value-and appropriately discount-forward-looking
projections and other information from issuers and other offering participants
that is not contained in the statutory prospectus.94 They would also value
information that is provided in the statutory prospectus if it is communicated in
89 See, e.g., Grundfest Stresses Economic Efficiency as Goal of Commission, Securities
Laws, 18 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1351, 1354 (Sept. 19,1986).
90 John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New Research
Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 4 (2003).
91In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, Fed. Reg.
76,635 (Feb. 9, 1959).
92 Id
93 Coffee, supra note 15, at 1151.
94 See Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the
Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 57, 82 (2006).
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more salient form that can be more quickly assimilated into the market price.95
Although not all investors are rational, an assumption of rationality will likely
approximate how the more sophisticated investors behave in the market.96 To
the extent such investors set the market price in secondary markets, the price
mechanism protects other retail investors.97 Sophisticated investors also help set
the price in IPO markets as issuers, or investment banks determine the issue
price largely based on the interest of sophisticated investors.98
Assuming the offering rules were designed to prevent unsophisticated
investors from going into a speculative frenzy and inflating the market price, the
rules do not appear to be tailored to achieve that purpose. For instance, the rule
requiring the statutory prospectus to proceed or accompany the delivery of a
free writing prospectus does not appear to be appropriately calibrated to achieve
its purpose. The primary purpose of the rule was to give investors meaningful
time to review the balanced information contained in the statutory prospectus
before making an investment decision based on the information contained in the
free writing prospectus. 99 However, an investor, suffering from some behavioral
bias, probably will not read the detailed statutory prospectus before purchasing
securities.100 In fact, empirical evidence suggests that retail investors are
unlikely to review the dense prospectus, and even if they do, they are unlikely
to absorb most of the information.10' Such investors would likely participate in
95 Chiappinelli, supra note 45, at 499.96 Choi, supra note 60, at 90. To the extent the SEC created the Quiet Period Rules
based on the belief that unsophisticated investors suffer from some behavioral bias and need
additional protection, the SEC should clearly disclose its concerns, rather than hiding behind
the generic mantra of "investor confidence." Behavioral biases that may interfere with an
investor's ability to appropriately calibrate information include overoptimism,
overconfidence, framing (i.e., determining the worth of an investment based on current
holdings), hindsight (i.e., placing too great an emphasis on events that have occurred), and
confirmation (i.e., rationalizing a poor investment decision as justified). Specifically, the
SEC should identify the types of investors it seeks to protect, how such investors engage in
flawed decision making, how the SEC predicts the regulations will protect such investors,
and the cost of the regulations to other investors who do not suffer from the same behavioral
bias. Such transparency would allow the courts, practitioners, scholars, and other
commentators to consider whether the rules are appropriately calibrated to respond to a
specific bias. Many of the offering rules appear illogical and sometimes inconsistent with
limiting specific biases.
97 Id
98 1A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
§ 8.03[4], at 8-60, 8-60.1 (Clark Boardman, 1992 rev.).
99 See Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Very likely
Congress thought a better time for meaningful prospectus reading was at the time of the
offer rather than in the context of confirmation and demand for payment.").
100 Robert G. Newkirk, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the Market in the Initial Public
Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1393, 1393 (1991) (explaining that the typical modem
investor often fails to read the prospectus of an issuing company).
101 See id.
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the hottest IPO without properly evaluating the information disclosed in the
statutory prospectus.
The Facebook IPO provides an illustrative example. Despite the silence of
Facebook, its Chief Executive Officer and founder Mark Zuckerberg, and its
lead underwriter Morgan Stanley, many retail investors purchased the stock
either without reading the prospectus or without adequately discounting the
value of the stock in light of information contained in the prospectus, including
specific risk factors.102 As a journalist explained, "Anybody who took the
trouble to read the prospectus could see that the company's growth was slowing
and that its costs were rising faster than its revenues. Anybody who didn't
bother to read the prospectus shouldn't have been buying shares in the first
place." 0 3
Further, if investors are not able to obtain information in salient form from
the issuer or other offering participant, an unsophisticated investor may turn to
chat rooms and Internet message boards to determine the worth of a
company.104 Information from these sources is inherently less reliable than
information that an issuer or other offering participant would release and is
unlikely to be filtered by analysts. 0 5 Accordingly, investors may be more likely
to go into a speculative buying frenzy based on information provided by these
unsecure sources, than based on information disclosed by issuers.
102 Shortly after its IPO, Facebook Inc., its Chief Executive Officer, Founder Mark
Zuckerberg, and banks including Morgan Stanley were sued by the social networking
leader's shareholders, who claimed the defendants hid Facebook's weakened growth
forecasts ahead of its $16 billion initial public offering. The defendants were accused of
concealing from investors during the IPO marketing process "a severe and pronounced
reduction" in revenue growth forecasts, resulting from increased use of its app or website
through mobile devices. However, Facebook included in its statutory prospectus that a lack
of mobile advertising was a risk factor. Jonathan Stempel & Dan Levine, Facebook, Banks
Sued over Pre-IPO Analyst Calls, REUTERS (May 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/05/23/us-facebook-lawsuit-idUSBRE84MORK20120523.
10 3 John Cassidy, Facebook Fiasco: Don't Leave It to the Lawyers, RATIONAL
IRRATIONALITY (May 23, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/
2012/05/facebook-ipo-lawyers.html.
10 4 See Fisch, supra note 94, at 70 (linking the dramatic growth in Internet securities
fraud to the increased investor reliance on chat rooms and other Internet sources).
105 See id. Fisch cites as an example the case of Jonathan Lebed, a fifteen-year-old who
purchased stock in small capitalization companies. See id. at 70-72 (citing Lebed, Securities
Act Release No. 7891, Exchange Act Release No. 43,307, 2000 WL 1353040 (Sept. 20,
2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7891.htm). After purchasing the
stock, Lebed posted hundreds of internet messages touting the stock using fictitious names.
The postings contained stock price predictions and statements that the stocks were
undervalued and "about to take off." According to the SEC, these postings caused the stock
price to increase dramatically, enabling Lebed to sell his shares at a significant profit. The
subject companies posted no news or press releases "that might have accounted for the
increases in price and volume." See id.
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B. Investor Confidence and Market Efficiency
The concern of a speculative frenzy is not only unfounded, but allowing
more information from issuers will increase, not reduce, market efficiency.
Additional speech from issuers would prompt additional reports by analysts,
reporters and others who would have the opportunity to debate the value of the
assertions the company makes. The ECMH predicts that this public information
would quickly be incorporated into the price of the securities making the price
more accurate. 106 The Quiet Period Rules, which indiscriminately exclude
information without exploring why the excluded information would distort
markets, lead to market inefficiencies.
One of the negative consequences of restricting speech of issuers and other
offering participants, particularly during an IPO, is that it also limits speech of
independent analysts and journalists. Analysts and reporters have little reason to
prepare reports on non-reporting companies when the only information that they
can respond to is that contained in the statutory prospectus. Jeff Corbin, the
CEO of a firm specializing in investor relations and marketing services,
explained that, while he remained silent in the months leading up to Facebook's
IPO, he was eager to break that silence and issue a report as soon as the quiet
period ended and Facebook and the lead underwriters issued their reports:
For the past month, I have followed Facebook's lead and remained quiet
during the "quiet period." The reason for this was there was nothing to say.
Everything that needed to be said was already said, and Facebook hadn't put
out any news of major business importance.
Well, today the quiet period officially ends, and so does my silence. I am
anxiously awaiting the analyst reports from the banks that helped take
Facebook public ....
Once I have a chance to review, I will report back on what the analysts say and
what investors should be looking for before investing more money in
Facebook. 107
Obviously investors, especially retail investors, would prefer to hear from
Jeff Corbin and other analysts before making the initial decision to invest in the
Facebook IPO.
Although Facebook and other issuers would voluntarily release only
positive forecasts and valuations during the offering process, countless news
outlets and analysts would be anxious to filter this information and pick the
106 "Prices are conceptualized as the discounted present value of the future earnings
(dividends, interest or principal payments, liquidation values, etc.) of the security." Newkirk,
supra note 100, at 1398. Although analysts develop certain estimates of the price, they
cannot precisely ascertain future events to tell the "exact" value of a security. Id. at 1399.
107 Jeff Corbin, Diary of an IPO: The Facebook Quiet Period Is Over, KCSA BLOG
(June 27, 2012), http://www.kcsa.com/kcsa-blogcat.php?tag-diary-of-an-ipo.
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statements apart if necessary. Among the purposes analysts serve are "ferreting
out facts and offering valuable insights on companies and industry trends." 08
This open dialogue between issuers, underwriters, and analysts would likely
increase investor confidence as they would be privy to discussions that likely
now take place privately at road shows.109
Further, the ECMH predicts that additional accurate information provided
by issuers, underwriters and analysts would quickly be incorporated into the
price of the securities, making the price more accurate. 110 The most widely
accepted "semi-strong" version of the hypothesis claims both that prices reflect
all publicly available information and that prices instantly change to reflect new
public information.'" The more information that is available about a given
stock, and the more reliable that information is, the more efficient the capital
markets will be at generating the appropriate price for that stock.112
If the offering rules were liberalized, additional information released during
the offering period would likely be reliable. Issuers and other offering
participants would have incentives to release accurate information because any
108 Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 30,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm.
109 The road show is the company's marketing trip to investors that takes place prior to
setting the actual price for the offering. It typically involves a few of the company's
executives who try to explain to investors why their company will be a good investment.
When the issuer and its underwriters "go on the road show before the offering, they
presumably have two main objectives. They wish to market" the securities to potential
investors, and "they seek to obtain more information on the true value of the firm." Michelle
Lowry & G. William Schwert, Is the IPO Pricing Process Efficient?, 71 J. FIN. ECoN. 3, 20
(2004).
IlOChiappinelli, supra note 45, at 497-99. The ECMH has generated widespread
judicial acceptance. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court recognized the ECMH
when it adopted the "fraud on the market theory" to impose liability on a company for
falsely denying merger negotiations. 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988). The Court held that a
plaintiff can satisfy the reliance requirement by showing that the market price of the security
as a whole was affected by the defendant's misstatement or omission and that the plaintiff
suffered a loss due to the transaction at that incorrect price. Id. at 247; see also Peter J.
Dennin, Which Came First, the Fraud or the Market: Is the Fraud-Created-the-Market
Theory Valid Under Rule lOb-5?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2619-22 (2001). Since the
financial crises at the turn of the century, the theory has been the subject of much critique.
See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233, 1241
(2002); David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 112 n.300 (2003).
111 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 404 (1970). There are two other versions of the ECMH. The weak
version claims that prices on traded assets such as stocks, bonds or property already reflect
all past publicly available information. The strong version also claims that prices instantly
reflect even hidden or "insider" information. See id. at 383; see also Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 555-56
(1984).112 Orcutt, supra note 90, at 49.
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false or misleading statements would be actionable under the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Act. Although truthful but optimistic statements
may not be actionable, sophisticated investors and analysts would adequately
discount the value of this puffery so that they would not influence the stock
price. The market price is largely driven by institutional investors who directly
own a large percentage of securities.11 3 Unsophisticated investors or retail
investors who are incapable of adequately discounting information would be
protected through this price mechanism.11 4 Accordingly, the gun-jumping
restrictions which indiscriminately exclude information would result in market
inefficiencies and ultimately harm all investors-even irrational investors.1 15
C. The ECMH and IPO Markets
Courts and commentators have been reluctant to extend the ECMH to IPO
markets which are not as open and developed as secondary markets where
securities are traded after the IPO.116 Supporters of the quiet period would
likely contend that information released during the offering period is likely to
cause more distortion in IPO markets than in more established markets. Because
there is less information available about an IPO, there will be less for analysts to
dissect when the company makes disclosures. Consequently, the company's
statements are more likely to cause an unwarranted jump in the price of the
offering. Although this argument has some merit, it does not provide sufficient
support for the current offering rules, which indiscriminately restrict even
truthful speech.
The mere fact that IPO markets are not as open and developed as secondary
markets does not mean that IPO markets are not sufficiently information-
113 The Federal Reserve Board reports that as of March 31, 2007, the household sector
directly owns less than 26% of corporate equities and less than 12% of corporate bonds. See
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS AccouNTs OF
THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDING, FIRST QUARTER 2007, at 89 tbl.L.212, 90
tbl.L.213 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20070607/zl.pdf.
114 The exchanges between sophisticated buyers and sellers usually set the price for
securities because sophisticated investors account for a significant number of trades. See,
e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PURPOSE 84 n.2 (1979) ("Institutions are so large a portion of the market that, as a group,
they can hardly outperform the market.").
Il5 See id. at 87.116 Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOzO L. REV.
711, 714-15 (2005) (explaining that the only time a stock price has not been subjected to
market forces, which protects investors by efficiently processing information and arriving at
an accurate market price, is in the context of an IPO). Since the Supreme Court's adoption of
the ECMH, lower courts have been reluctant to extend the theory to IPO markets. See, e.g.,
Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990); Peil v. Speiser, 806
F.2d 1154, 1161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 746 (11th
Cir. 1984).
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efficient to incorporate public information into the offering price.11 7 To the
contrary, underwriters and other professionals, involved in almost every IPO, 118
quickly incorporate material public information about a security into a
competitive offering price.1 9 The role of the underwriter is analogous to the
role of sophisticated investors who set the stock price in secondary markets.
Empirical evidence suggests that underwriters fully incorporate public
information discovered during the registration period into the offer price, while
they only partially incorporate private information learned during the road
show.120 Another study demonstrated that the underwriters' treatment of public
information is almost consistent with an efficient IPO pricing process.121 The
study concluded that while underwriters omit some public information when
they set the final offer price, the vast majority of public information is fully
incorporated.122 For this reason, underwriters continue to analyze new
information, and do not set the final price for the issue, until a few hours before
actual sales begin.123
With additional truthful information, the price of the issue will more likely
reflect the expected return on an investment in the shares. Similar to secondary
offerings, liberalizing the offering rules for initial offerings would likely result
in the release of additional reliable information, rather than false or misleading
information because of the anti-fraud provisions. To the extent issuers release
promotional statements or puffery, analysts would be able to respond to these
statements to ensure that underwriters appropriately discount the value of these
117 See, e.g., Newkirk, supra note 100, at 1407. The ECMH only requires a showing of
information efficiency (i.e., that public information will quickly be incorporated into share
prices). "Value efficiency," on the other hand, is a far more controversial proposition as it
concerns whether the price of the security accurately represents its "value" at any point in
time and requires specific, sometimes unobtainable information. See John A. MacKerron,
The Price Integrity Cause of Action Under Rule 10b-5: Limiting and Expanding the Use of
the Fraud on the Market Theory, 69 OR. L. REv. 177, 208-09 (1990) (noting the absence of
value efficiency in the real world and critiquing courts' reliance on such efficiency for fraud
on the market cases).
Il8 See Newkirk, supra note 100, at 1412 (noting that it is rare for a company to issue
securities directly to the public without at least one underwriter).
119 Other, less significant indicia of efficiency in [PO markets include: "(1) the issuance
of a significant volume of securities; (2) a large number of potential investors; [and] (3)
participation by professional investors outside of the IPO (such as pension fund managers or
brokerage firms)." Id. at 1414.
120 Id. at 23. The different treatment of public and private information is probably a
result of underwriters compensating investors for the private information by only partially
incorporating it into the offer price, thus allowing the informed investors to earn especially
high returns on the first day the IPO firms trade. Id. at 24. By contrast, there is no need for
underwriters to reward any group of investors for providing public information, which by
definition is provided to everyone, including the underwriter. Id. at 25.
121 Lowry & Schwert, supra note 109, at 6.
122 Id
123Id. at 7; see also RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES
REGULATION 32 (6th ed. 1987).
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statements in pricing the offering. Although the sources analysts can rely on are
more limited for non-reporting issuers than reporting issuers, analysts could rely
on the registration statement and their general knowledge of particular
industries to counter puffery.
Further, lead underwriters have incentives not to overprice the offering
based on puffery. First, underwriters set the price of securities to sell the
offering completely. If the offer price is set high because underwriters have not
appropriately discounted promotional information, sophisticated investors
would refrain from purchasing securities and the underwriters or issuers would
be stuck with the unsold shares.124 Also, underwriters are particularly interested
in preserving their reputational capital, particularly in IPO markets where there
is an opportunity to conduct follow-on offerings for the issuer. 125 Finally,
underwriters have an interest in not over-valuing stock because a large gap
between IPO price and secondary trading price may reflect some false or
misleading statements and may provoke possible rescission as a remedy for
such violations. 126 For these reasons, any unduly positive information about an
IPO will be quickly discounted. IPO markets are sufficiently efficient in
processing public information that additional accurate information released by
underwriters, issuers, and analysts would improve market efficiency and result
in a more accurate issue price.
IV. THE OFFERING RULES: LAWFUL RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH OR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH
The offering rules not only raise efficiency concerns, but also pose serious
First Amendment challenges. Government restrictions on the disclosure of
truthful, non-misleading speech for the purpose of protecting those who would
hear the speech are unlikely to survive a First Amendment challenge. Although
the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on the constitutionality of
securities regulations, the Court has developed two distinct but overlapping
doctrines to protect corporate speech. The commercial speech doctrine applies
an intermediate level of review to speech that is economic in nature or
otherwise has the intent of convincing the listener to partake in a particular
124 Most IPOs are conducted through an underwriting group or syndicate. Typically the
underwriting syndicate purchases the new issue of securities from the issuer and then sells
the securities to the public. The difference between the amount paid by the underwriting
syndicate to the issuer and the amount paid by the public is the underwriters' gross profit,
referred to as the "underwriting spread." See Anita Indira Anand, The Efficiency of Direct
Public Offerings, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 433, 436 (2003).
125 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection ofInvestors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 688-89 (1984).
126 Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial
Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REv. 965, 965-66 (1995).
2013] 211
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
transaction. 127 However, speech that is political in nature receives the highest
level of protection as political deliberation, and commentary is often recognized
as a core purpose of the First Amendment.128 The expansion of these doctrines
over the past few decades and the Court's robust articulation of corporate
political speech rights in Citizens United v. FECl2 9 make it increasingly likely
that a First Amendment challenge to the antiquated Quiet Period Rules will be
brought and will succeed.
A. The Expansion of Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment
Until 1976, the commercial speech doctrine established structural divides
between different categories of speech. 130 These divides were based on a
speaker-centered model of free speech which focused on the inherent right of
the speaker to speak and a "prophylactic refusal to permit the government to
pick and choose [which speech] should be tolerated." 131 This model provided
significant protection for speech concerning religion, 132 politics,133 science,134
or aesthetics,135 but virtually no protection for speech about consumer
choice,136 labor relations137 or capital formation. 138
127 Generally, the Supreme Court defines commercial speech as speech that "proposes a
commercial transaction." Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989).
128 Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 12-15 (1989).
129 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
130 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-73, 776 (1976).
13 1Neuborne, supra note 128, at 25. A classic example of the Supreme Court applying a
speaker-centered theory of the First Amendment was when the Court found a state
injunction preventing a Nazi group from parading swastikas and distributing literature that
incited hatred against Jewish people unconstitutional. Nat'l Socialist Party v. Vill. of Skokie,
432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977).
132 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding
that children cannot be compelled to salute flag and pledge in violation of religious belief).
133 See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
134 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
135 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (holding that literature is a
protected form of expression).
136 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)
(concluding that advertisement for optical care products was not protected).
137 See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226-27
(1982) (finding that political boycott by labor union was not protected speech).
138 Challenges to government regulation in the area of capital markets have been rare
and unsuccessful. See, e.g., SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1371, 1379-80
(2d Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court attempted to end the speculation that recognition of the
protected nature of commercial speech would prohibit SEC regulation. See Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-
62 (1973).
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In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, the Supreme Court abandoned this rigid structural divide and held that
economic speech in the area of consumer affairs should be protected.139
Specifically, the Court found that the right of pharmacists to advertise their
products was constitutionally protected.140 This paradigm shift was premised on
the belief that listeners had an interest in hearing commercial speech in order to
enhance their ability to make an informed choice and act more efficiently.141
Although the Court did not set forth a precise standard of review, the Court held
that commercial speech was subject to less protection than non-commercial
speech.142 Unlike political or religious speech, false or misleading commercial
speech could be regulated.143
A few years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, the Supreme Court found that New York's attempt to
diminish oil consumption by forbidding electric companies from advertising
heat was unconstitutional because it was more draconian than necessary.144 The
Court developed a four-part inquiry for determining whether a ban on
commercial speech is unconstitutional:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.145
This analysis continues to serve as the benchmark for whether a regulatory
burden on commercial speech violates the First Amendment.146 Generally, the
party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the heavy
burden ofjustifying the restriction. 147
A few years after Central Hudson was decided, it appeared that the
Supreme Court developed a vice exception to the commercial speech doctrine.
The Court upheld state prohibitions on casino and lottery advertisements on the




142Id. at 771-72 n.24.
14 3 See id. at 749.
144Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 557-58
(1980) (holding that a Public Service Commission regulation that completely banned
promotional advertising by electric utilities violated the First Amendment). Justice
Blackmun, whose position did not command a majority, believed that if the government
wished to deter the use of electric heat or promote energy conservation, it must do so
directly and not through the medium of information control. Id. at 579.
145 Id. at 566.
146 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001).
14 7 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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theory that if the legislature could prohibit an activity such as gambling, it could
also prohibit advertising about that activity.148 In the 1996 decision, 44
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court shifted back to a more speech-
protective analysis, explicitly rejecting a vice exception to the commercial
speech doctrine.149 The Court invalidated a statute prohibiting the advertisement
of alcohol prices because the ban provided only ineffective and remote support
for promoting temperance, and other less speech-restrictive means were
available. 50 Notably, the Court recognized the significance of truthful speech in
First Amendment doctrine and expressed its reluctance to condone government
suppression of such speech for paternalistic reasons. 151 As Justice Stevens
explained, the Court is "especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good." 52
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor proposed that the government should only
be permitted to restrict the flow of truthful information where (i) the regulator
has conducted a "carefu[1] calculate[ion of] the costs and benefits associated
with the burden on speech," (ii) there are no "less burdensome alternatives"
available, and (iii) alternative methods of communicating the same material
exist.'5 3 The actual level of review in these cases appears to be closer to a strict,
rather than an intermediate, level of scrutiny.154
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly the Court extended its emphasis on
protecting truthful speech.155 The challenge was to a ban on outdoor advertising
of smokeless tobacco and cigars in Massachusetts.156 The government's
concerns about tobacco use related both to healthcare spending and protection
of minors.157 Despite these legitimate and well-documented interests, the Court
struck down the ban as unduly broad because it effectively prevented businesses
from disseminating information about lawful products to adults. 58 The Court
concluded that the ban was more restrictive than necessary to fulfill the
148 See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 436 (1993) (upholding a
ban on lottery advertisements in non-lottery states); Posadas de P.R. v. Tourism Co. of P.R.,
478 U.S. 328, 346-48 (1986) (upholding state's prohibition on advertising for casino
gambling on the theory that the state's power to entirely prohibit gambling implied the right
to restrict speech). But see Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 412 (1993).
14944 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
150 Id. at 504-08 (plurality opinion).
151 Id. at 510 (plurality opinion).
152 Id. at 503 (plurality opinion).
153 Id. at 529-30 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
154 Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment's Application to Securities
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 789, 796-97 (2007).
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government's interest. 159 This decision signaled that the Court was willing to
protect speech rights even in the face of a cognizable regulatory objective.1 60
While the commercial speech case law has been confined to product or
service advertisements,161 statements made by issuers during an offering are a
"natural candidate" for the extension of the doctrine.162 There is a broad range
of speech relating to the purchase or sale of securities that is either required to
be disclosed1 63 or prohibited from being disclosed.164 If such speech is
considered commercial speech, the regulations calling for corporations to speak
in this manner must meet the Central Hudson test in order for them to be
constitutional.165 Recently, the Court expressed interest in considering the
expansion of commercial speech beyond pure product advertising.166 The
securities regulation would be a logical extension of the doctrine because such
regulations relate to proposing or effecting a transaction, and regulators are
concerned about listeners of this speech.167
The Supreme Court initially appeared reluctant to extend the commercial
speech doctrine to a heavily regulated area, such as the securities laws.168
159 1d. at 565-66.
160 Lloyd L. Drury III, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment
Constraints on SEC Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REv. 757, 770 (2007); Tamara R.
Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 16, 16 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/piety.pdf
(predicting heightened protection for commercial speech).
161 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011); Thompson v. W.
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
162 Drury, supra note 160, at 761.
163 For example, public corporations have periodic reporting obligations. See
Management's Discussion of Financial Condition, Securities Act Release No. 33-6835, 43
SEC Docket 1330, 1330 (May 18, 1989).
164 For example, see the gun-jumping restrictions discussed supra Part II.
165 Drury, supra note 160, at 761.
166 1n 2003, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal challenging California's ability
to prevent Nike from conducting a public relations campaign in response to accusations that
its labor practices in certain Asian countries were unfair. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d
243, 247-48 (2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1098, 1099-100 (2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S.
654, 655 (2003) (per curiam). The California Supreme Court rejected Nike's claim that
California's Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law deprived it of its right to
free speech in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 262. The Supreme Court originally
granted certiorari to determine if these advertisements should be treated as commercial
speech, given heightened scrutiny because it was a matter of public concern, or given lower
scrutiny because the speech was false or misleading. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654,
657 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (dismissing certiorari); see also Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537
U.S. 1099-100 (2003) (granting certiorari). However, the Court dismissed the case on the
grounds that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted. See Kasky, 539 at 655 (2003)
(dismissing certiorari).
167 Drury, supra note 160, at 771.168 1n Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, the Court noted that "both Congress and state
legislatures have . . . strictly regulated public expression by issuers of and dealers in
securities ... commanding what they must and must not publish and announce." 413 U.S.
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However, under the reasoning of Liquormart, the government cannot censor
speech solely because the speech relates to activities that the government can
regulate. 169 Accordingly, the fact that the SEC could act more drastically under
its power to regulate commercial activity should not exempt the SEC's speech
regulations from scrutiny under the commercial speech doctrine.170 As a leading
first amendment lawyer, James Goodale, opined "[o]ne trend is clear: the SEC's
regulation of securities will no longer enjoy an automatic immunity from the
dictates of the First Amendment." 171 In fact, the SEC itself recognized that its
regulations may be subject to First Amendment review. 172
Further, several recent cases have raised First Amendment challenges to
SEC regulations, but these cases have been resolved on other grounds. 173 Each
case involved restrictions on the flow of information that was of conceded
assistance to listeners in making informed and autonomous choices about
capital formation issues. As an example, in Lowe v. SEC the SEC sought to
enjoin the publication of an investment newsletter because the author was
ineligible for an investment analyst's license. 174 There were no allegations that
the content of the newsletter was false or misleading. The Supreme Court
avoided the constitutional issue by narrowly interpreting the SEC's licensing
power under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, but stated that "it is difficult
49, 61-62 (1973). More specifically, the Court in Ohlarik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n expressed
the presumption that SEC disclosures were beyond the scope of the First Amendment:
"Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending
the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities. . . ." 436 U.S.
447, 456 (1978) (holding that Ohio may regulate face-to-face solicitations of potential
clients, because the speech was intended to further a business transaction over which the
state had regulatory authority).
169 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502-04 (1996).
170 Drury, supra note 160, at 771.
171 James C. Goodale, The First Amendment and Securities Act: A Collision Course?,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 1983, at 1 (characterizing the First Amendment and securities regulation as
on a "collision course").
172 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,279 (Oct. 22,
1992); see also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that the SEC
maintained loopholes in its regulation because of its "sensitivity" to First Amendment
concerns).
173 See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1985)
(denying LILCO's request for an injunction to restrict a candidate for public office from
using advertisements to urge LILCO shareholders to replace the incumbent board on the
grounds that such "indirect[]" solicitations were not covered by the proxy rules and the First
Amendment protected the anti-LILCO ads); SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365,
374-76 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989) (holding that anti-touting
provisions of the Securities Act do not require an investment newsletter to inform its readers
that the authors of the articles were also the subjects of the articles, but do require disclosure
of whether it was being paid to run the article).
174 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 184 (1985).
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to see why the expression of an opinion about a marketable security should not"
be protected by the First Amendment.175
In a concurrence, Justice White, supported by two other justices, explained
that the SEC's actions could never have survived a constitutional review
because the means were more extensive than necessary to prevent a "mere
possibility" of fraud.' 7 6 The government's fear that a future newsletter might
contain false or misleading information cannot justify the suppression of current
speech that a hearer has an interest in receiving.177
Such a reverse prophylaxis, which suppresses useful speech today in order to
avoid the risk of harmful speech tomorrow, can rarely, if ever, be justified from
a hearer-centered point of view. In effect, it asks current hearers to forego
information that they wish to receive in order to assure that hypothetical future
hearers will not risk receiving harmful information. 178
What this, and similar actions demonstrate is that "challengers have begun
to establish a first amendment beachhead in what once appeared to be an
impregnable area."' 79
Many scholars have expressed concern with extending the doctrine to
securities regulation because striking down such regulation would result in
widespread harm to capital markets.180 Concerns over extending protections are
tempered by the fact that most securities regulations would survive First
Amendment review under the commercial speech doctrine. The regulation of
false or misleading speech is consistent with the commercial speech doctrine.' 8'
Mandatory disclosure rules would likely survive constitutional review. 182 The
only provisions which would raise serious free speech concerns are those that
prohibit the disclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and sometimes material
speech based on paternalistic concerns, such as the Quiet Period Rules.183
175Id. at 210 n.58.
176Id. at 235 (White, J., concurring).
177Id. at 234-35.
178 Neubome, supra note 128, at 43.
179Id. at 42.
180 See, e.g., Allen D. Boyer, Free Speech, Free Markets, and Foolish Consistency, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 474, 495 (1992) (reviewing NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC (1990)).
181 Cases holding that the First Amendment does not protect false or misleading
economic speech would remain good law under the commercial speech doctrine. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
182 In at least one case, the SEC rule survived strict First Amendment scrutiny. See
Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 938, 944-48 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding Rule G-37 that
restricted political contributions by parties involved in the municipal securities market).
183 The Supreme Court has provided little guidance regarding the First Amendment's
application to securities regulation. When the Securities Act was enacted, the Supreme Court
had already recognized constitutional rights of corporations, see Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886), but had not yet extended First Amendment coverage to
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B. Quiet Period Rules and the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Speech of an issuer or underwriter during the offering period closely
resembles traditional advertising. This type of speech "alerts the market to a
new product-an offering of securities-that market participants may want to
purchase."1 84 These types of advertisements have been characterized as
commercial speech in other contexts. 185 Further, like advertisements of
consumer products, the SEC restricts offering communications because of
paternalistic concerns over the listeners of such speech. The SEC's broad
prophylactic approach to speech during the offering period raises serious First
Amendment concerns. For the alleged purposes of preventing fraud, protecting
investors, and increasing market efficiency, the SEC restricts the dissemination
of truthful, non-misleading speech that would assist many listeners in making
informed autonomous decisions about whether to purchase securities and would
ultimately increase market efficiency under the ECMH.
The communications disseminated by Groupon's CEO, Andrew Mason, and
its chairman, co-founder, and dominant shareholder, Eric Lefkofsky, during the
waiting period provide an excellent test case for analyzing the constitutionally
of the offering rules under the commercial speech doctrine. 186 The publication
of Andrew Mason's internal e-mail describing Groupon's success and Eric
Lefkofsky's statement during an interview with Bloomberg that Groupon would
be "wildly profitable," likely violated Section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act.187
corporate speech, see First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-83 (1978).
After the Supreme Court recognized First Amendment protection to commercial speech, an
impressive list of commentators, scholars, and practitioners argued that securities regulation
was outside the reach of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 180, at 495 ("The
Court has instead rejected any implication that the First Amendment should be applied in the
securities field."); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1770-71,
1777-80 (2004); see also Law Professors Brief as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss at 16-22, SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04
CV 5130(GBD)) (signatories are prominent securities professors including, John C. Coffee,
Jr., Alan R. Bromberg, James D. Cox, Melvin Eisenberg, Jill E. Fisch, Theresa A. Gabaldon,
Thomas Lee Hazen, Howell Jackson, Donald C. Langevoort, Ronald M. Levin, Henry
Monaghan, Donna M. Nagy, Neil M. Richards, Margaret V. Sachs, Hillary A. Sale, Joel
Seligman, Larry D. Soderquist, Marc I. Steinberg, Lynn Stout, Steven Thel, Robert B.
Thompson, and William K.S. Wang) (arguing that there was a securities exception from the
First Amendment for securities regulation based on dicta from two early cases). Recently,
several scholars have demonstrated that there is no reasonable justification for a securities
regulation exemption to First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Drury, supra note 160, at
759-60; Page, supra note 154, at 829-30.
184 Drury, supra note 160, at 781.185 See discussion supra Part IV.A.186 See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text for a description of Groupon's
statements.
187 Section 5(b)(1) prohibits a company from making any written offers other than by
means of a statutory prospectus during the waiting period. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1),
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The communications would constitute gun-jumping even if the statements were
entirely accurate.
The communications would probably not fall into one of the exemptions
created by the 2005 Securities Offering Reforms or the JOBS Act.188 The only
exception that would arguably protect the communications would be the media
free writing exception.189 Bloomberg's broadcast of Lefkofsky's statement
would probably be characterized as an unaffiliated free writing prospectus. But,
it does not appear that Groupon met the conditions for using this exception
(e.g., it did not properly file the broadcast with the SEC or include the requisite
legend).190 The publication of Mason's memo would probably be characterized
as an affiliated free writing prospectus as it was prepared by the CEO of
Groupon.191 As such, it would not be protected by the exception as it could not
have been accompanied or preceded by the most recent statutory prospectus.1 92
To determine the constitutionality of the gun-jumping restrictions under the
Central Hudson test, a court must determine as a threshold matter, whether the
communications concerned lawful activity and were not misleading.193
Assuming the statements in Groupon were factually accurate, the SEC may
argue that the information was nonetheless misleading because it contained
incomplete information that could unduly influence investment decisions.
However, in light of the negative publicity about the Groupon offering, and the
balanced information contained in the statutory prospectus, it does not appear
that the Mason Memo or Lefkofsky statement were inherently misleading.
Further, the Securities Act contains provisions that would minimize the risk of
deception. For instance, the rules require Groupon to deliver its statutory
prospectus to a potential investor at least 48 hours before any commitment to
purchase securities becomes binding. 194 This period effectively gives investors
15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006). The broad definition of prospectus includes written communications
as well as broadcast communications, such as TV and radio transmissions. See discussion
supra Part II.A.
188 See discussion supra Part II.B-C for a description of these reforms.
189 Securities Act of 1933 Rule 164, 17 C.F.R. § 230.164 (2012); Securities Act of 1933
Rule 433(f), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(f) (2012). The communications would not be protected
under the bright line safe harbor because they were disclosed after the filing of the
registration statement. See Securities Act of 1933 Rule 163A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A (2012).
They would also not be protected as ordinary course communications as they were not
routine communications and they contained predictions related to the company's financial
performance. See Securities Act Rule 169, 17 C.F.R. § 230.169 (2012). The communications
would also not be protected as free writing prospectuses as they were not accompanied with
or preceded by the most recent statutory prospectus and did not include other prerequisites.
See Securities Act of 1933 Rule 433(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(b)(2) (2012).
190 See discussion supra Part II.B.
191 See discussion supra Part II.B.
192 See discussion supra Part II.B.
193 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9
(1980).
194 DAVID A. LIPTON, 15 BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 3:57 (2012) (outlining
prospectus dissemination requirements).
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an opportunity to carefully calibrate all material information regarding the
offering before purchasing securities. 195 Although an investor may irrationally
ignore the information contained in the prospectus, this mere potential for
deception would not justify a categorical suppression of speech.196 Rather such
potentially misleading speech could only be suppressed if the restriction is
appropriately tailored and satisfies the remaining prongs of the Central Hudson
test. 197 Accordingly, under Central Hudson, the release would not be false or
misleading unprotected speech.
The next step would be to determine whether the proffered government
interests in enacting the offering rules are substantial.198 One interest the
government would likely assert is preventing fraud orchestrated by
manipulative communications advertising securities offerings.199  The
government would also assert the related interest of protecting investor
confidence in capital markets. 200 Finally, the government would assert an
interest in providing for greater market efficiency by ensuring that investors
have access to, and time to consider, the disclosures contained within the
prospectus and the registration statement.201 The government clearly has a
substantial interest in regulating speech during the offering period.
195 Securities Exchange Act 15c2-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8(b) (requiring the broker
or dealer for an offering involving a nonreporting company to deliver a copy of the
preliminary prospectus).
196 See Peel v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)
(holding that while inherently misleading speech may be prohibited entirely, potentially
misleading speech may not be categorically suppressed unless the character or the statements
create a state interest sufficiently substantial to justify a categorical ban on their use).
197Edward T. Highberger, Note, Not So Fast! Scrutinizing the "Gun Jumping"
Provisions of the Securities Act Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 2141, 2169 (2008).
198 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
199 This purpose can be traced to the original enactment of the Securities Act which was
to prevent fraud by providing for full disclosure of a company's operations, financials,
markets, and risks. Orcutt, supra note 90, at 42.
200 Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,721, 44,796 (Aug. 3, 2005) (justifying the 2005 Securities Offering Reforms as
increasing both "market efficiency" and "investor confidence" leading to "more efficient
capital formation").
201 H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1 (1933) (stating that one of the purposes was to "provide
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold"). The waiting period was
intended to interfere with the reckless traditions of. . . the securities business. It
contemplates a change from methods of distribution lately in vogue which attempted
complete sale of an issue sometimes within 1 day or at most a few days. . . . [A]ny issue
which cannot stand the test of a waiting inspection over a month's average of economic
conditions, but must be floated within a few days upon the crest of a possibly
manipulated market fluctuation, is not a security which deserves protection ....
Id. at 7-8; see also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 574 (2d
Cir. 1970) ("One of the evils of a premature offer is its tendency to encourage the formation
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Since the first two inquiries yielded positive answers, Central Hudson
requires analysis of whether the regulation directly and materially advances the
governmental interests asserted. 202 The SEC would not be able to satisfy this
burden "by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, . . . the [the SEC] must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree." 203 The SEC would likely be able to provide
sufficient evidentiary support that the gun-jumping restrictions directly advance
their interests in preventing fraud. The speech restrictions imposed on issuers
and related parties during the offering period make it more difficult for those
parties to deceive investors.
However, it will be difficult for the SEC to demonstrate that the offering
rules make markets materially more efficient.204 The SEC would probably
contend that the offering rules increase investor confidence and market
efficiency because they restrict issuers and underwriters from disclosing
optimistic information, which may result in an unwarranted jump in offering
price. This conclusion relies on a flawed premise that optimistic information
released during the offering period would cause investors to go into a
speculative frenzy. Instead, given the ECMH, the impact of more speech would
be positive: the public availability of additional accurate information would be
beneficial to sophisticated investors who would quickly assimilate the
additional information into the share price. Even if some investors are not
sophisticated, they would be protected against misinterpreting optimistic
statements through the price mechanism. Although the hypothesis is not as
strong for IPOs as it is for secondary offerings, IPO markets are sufficiently
information efficient to incorporate additional information into the offering
price.205
Whatever the strength of the SEC's evidence to justify the offering
regulations, the rules would not satisfy the final step of the Central Hudson
analysis. The critical inquiry in a case challenging the offering rules will be
whether the government can demonstrate a "reasonable fit between the means
and ends of the regulatory scheme." 206 The SEC has used a "radical
prophylactic approach to speech-banning all speech that might be harmful to
someone, some day."207
The SEC would probably assert that the broad prophylactic rules restricting
most speech for IPOs are necessary to prevent harmful speech, despite its
concededly restrictive effect on speech that would be of use to listeners. Broad
by the offeree of an opinion of the value of the securities before a registration statement and
prospectus are filed.").20 2 Cen. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
203 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
204 See Chiappinelli, supra note 45, at 497-99.
205 See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the ECMH in IPO markets.
20 6 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (citing Cen. Hudson, 447
U.S. at 569).
207 Neuborne, supra note 128, at 51.
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restrictions are necessary, the SEC would contend, because it is difficult to
differentiate fraudulent or misleading advertisements from truthful and harmless
commercial speech before listeners are harmed by such speech. Post-hoc
litigation often comes too late to protect investors, especially if the issuer is
insolvent. Broader restrictions on securities advertisements are necessary, the
SEC would argue, because securities are intangible and derive their value from
information supplied by issuers and related parties rather than some inherent
worth.208 This concern is particularly acute in an IPO market where there is less
analyst coverage and no past reporting obligations.
This argument proceeds from the premise that it is intrinsically more
difficult to distinguish the false or misleading from the truthful and helpful in
advertisements involving the value of a company than in advertisements
involving goods or services. 209 This notion is belied by the fact that
distinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive claims in advertising in virtually
any field of commerce may require resolution of exceedingly complex and
technical factual issues and the consideration of difficult questions of
semantics. 210 Further, the SEC often carries the regulatory burden of
distinguishing between truthful and false or misleading statements. 211 Often
statements contained in an advertisement, publication or broadcast involving the
value of a company are verifiable, and if they are indeed false or misleading
they would be actionable under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act.
Another safeguard against deception in the securities markets are research
analysts and news outlets. Unlike when the Securities Act was originally
enacted, today if a company like Groupon says it is going to be wildly profitable
and it is not, there are plenty of news outlets and analysts that will immediately
pick the statement apart. Justice White's concurrence in Lowe v. SEC signals
that the Supreme Court may invalidate restrictions that suppress speech as part
of a prophylactic assault on potentially harmful speech.212
Although the SEC may be concerned that optimistic communications
released during the offering period may mislead unsophisticated investors,
commercial speech cases do not allow such paternalistic concerns over whether
listeners or investors can handle truthful information to serve as the basis for
208 See Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 82-83 (1989).
209 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 644-45 (1985).
210 The Zauderer Court wrote:
A brief survey of the body of case law that has developed as a result of the Federal
Trade Commission's efforts to carry out its mandate under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to eliminate 'unfair or deceptive acts or practices in . . . commerce,'
reveals that distinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising [is challenging].
Id. at 645 (citation omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)).
211Id. at 646.
212472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
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prohibiting speech. 213 As the leading commercial speech case reasoned, the
government may not "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly
truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients." 2 14 Any argument that the SEC
would make that the rules are necessary to protect unsophisticated investors
would probably be unavailing. The Supreme Court has reasoned that the
government should not "chok[e] off access to information that may be useful
to" some citizens, in order to protect other citizens.215 As the Court explained, if
it allowed the differentiation argument to prevail, First Amendment protection
of commercial speech would be rendered virtually meaningless. 216 It would be
difficult to prevent the government from suppressing other forms of truthful and
nondeceptive advertising "simply to spare itself the trouble of distinguishing
such advertising from false or deceptive advertising." 217 Recent commercial
speech decisions have been "grounded in the faith that the free flow of
commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be
regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful
from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful." 218
The policy chosen and expressed by Congress is "[d]isclosure, and not
paternalistic withholding of accurate information." 219 Rather than suppressing
speech, the Supreme Court prefers disclaimers or warnings as a means of
limiting the influence of potentially misleading speech. 220 The requirement
2 13 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
773 (1976).
214Id.; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502-04 (plurality
opinion) (noting that a state may regulate commercial speech to protect consumers from
misleading or deceptive speech, but may not prohibit the dissemination of truthful, non-
misleading speech). The Supreme Court seems reluctant to suppress truthful speech in the
name of protecting the public. See Drury, supra note 160, at 780-82.2 15 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 645 n.12; see also id at 647 (holding that the restriction on
attorney advertisements containing truthful nondeceptive information and advice regarding
legal rights could not be justified).
2 16 See id. at 646.
2 17 Id.2 18 Id
2 19 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988); see also Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) ("[The State
may not] completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its
recipients.").
220 The restrictions also seem too extensive with respect to the government's interest in
market efficiency. The restriction on all paid advertisements suppresses not only false or
misleading speech but also truthful speech. Less restrictive disclaimers or warnings
combined with anti-fraud measures would serve to prevent the dissemination of false or
misleading advertisements without interfering with the dissemination of truthful information.
Accordingly it does not appear that the reach of the gun-jumping restrictions is reasonably
fitted to the purpose of market efficiency.
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contained in offering rules that certain permissible communications, such as a
free writing prospectus, contain a detailed legend serves this purpose.221
The indiscriminate suppression of both fraudulent and truthful speech,
suggests that the SEC "did not carefully calculat[e] the costs and benefits
associated with the burden on speech imposed by the regulations." 222 In fact
when questioned about such a cost benefit analysis of the Quiet Period Rules
the SEC responded: "Neither the Commission nor the staff has had occasion to
consider the constitutionality of the quiet period rules under the First
Amendment," and such questions are "typically best considered in context." 223
The time is ripe for the SEC to consider the constitutionality of the offering
rules and the burdens it places on issuers and underwriters, especially in IPO
markets.
The broad prophylactic restrictions on the scope and timing of accurate
promotional activity in the capital markets raises serious First Amendment
corporate free speech concerns.
V. IMPACT OF CITIZENS UNITED ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OFFERING
RULES
In a recent landmark decision, Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court
held that corporations engaging in political speech are entitled to the same First
Amendment protection as individuals. 224 Although directed at political speech,
the broad language undercuts one of the basic premises of the commercial
speech doctrine-that corporations advertising their products or services are
entitled to less protection than individuals engaging in more valuable speech.
This case also suggests that the offering rules may ultimately be subject to a
strict scrutiny review as the current rules would prevent issuers from engaging
in political speech during the offering process. 225
A. Citizens United and Corporate Political Speech
While Central Hudson imposed significant restrictions on the government's
ability to restrict commercial speech, the opinion did not reach political speech.
It was not until 2010, in Citizens United, that the Court imposed meaningful
restrictions on the government's ability to regulate political speech of
221 See supra note 71 and accompanying text for an example of such a legend.
222 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (alteration in original)
(quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2 23 Schapiro Letter, supra note 7, at 9.
2 24 See 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
225 See Alexander F. L. Sand, Note, Invested in Politics: Gun Jumping, Corporate
Political Speech, and Citizens United, 40 HOFSTRA L. REv. 309, 324 ("It is Citizens United
however, the most recent case to address the issue of corporate speech protections, that
provides the broadest and fiercest articulation of corporate free speech to date.").
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corporations. 226 Before Citizens United, the Court had vacillated in its
approach to corporate speech. Under Buckley v. Valeo227 and First Nat'1 Bank
of Bos. v. Bellotti,22 8 restrictions on speech could not be based on the speaker's
corporate identity: "In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is
constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons
may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue." 229 To bypass this
line of cases, the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce230 and
McConnell v. FEC2 31 identified a new government interest in limiting political
speech of corporations: an anti-distortion interest. These decisions identified a
compelling governmental interest in preventing "the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas." 232
In rejecting Austin's anti-distortion rationale, the Citizens United Court held
that the First Amendment prohibited the government from suppressing
corporate political speech, but permitted the government to impose disclaimer
and disclosure obligations. 233 Citizens United made clear that the government's
ability to restrict corporate political speech runs congruent to its ability to
restrict individual political speech.
The case involved Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation that planned to
release a ninety-minute documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie, within thirty
days of the 2008 primary elections. 234 The film criticized Hillary Clinton, a
candidate in the Democratic Party's presidential primary elections. 235
Concerned that the release would violate Section 441b of the McCain-Feingold
Act and Section 2003 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the
BCRA), Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Federal Election Commission (FEC).236 The Supreme Court concluded that the
226 See id
227 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (finding the independent expenditure ceiling on campaign
contributions unconstitutional because it fails to serve any substantial government interest in
curtailing corruption in the electoral process).
228 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (striking down a state-
law prohibition on corporate independent expenditures related to referenda issues).
229Id. at 784-85.
230494 U.S. 652, 664 (1990) (upholding a statute that prohibited corporations from
using their general treasury funds for independent expenditures opposing or supporting
candidates in state elections), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
231 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding a federal regulation that barred corporations from
using general treasury funds to create advertisements that mention a candidate's name within
sixty days of an election), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
232Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
233 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876-77.
234Id. at 888.
235Id at 887.
236Id. at 876, 904-05; Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and
the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 887, 893 (2011).
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FEC could not prevent Citizens United from using funds from individuals and
for-profit corporations to make a documentary about Hillary Clinton available
on cable television. 237
In finding the Section 441b prohibition to be facially unconstitutional,
Justice Kennedy equated the constitutional dignity of corporations to that of
natural persons. 238 Corporations enjoy the same right to speech as individuals
because "[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too
often simply a means to control content." 239 Like individuals, corporations and
other associations are participants in the marketplace of ideas.240 "Political
speech is 'indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual."' 24 1
Accordingly, restrictions on corporate political speech should be subject to the
same strict scrutiny review as restrictions on individual core speech.242 Under
this standard, the government must show that the restriction "furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."243
Relying on Austin, the government asserted that the restriction should pass
muster even under a strict scrutiny review because it had a compelling interest
in regulating corporate political speech to prevent corporations from gaining an
"unfair advantage" in the political marketplace. 244 Without these restrictions
corporations with large amounts of resources could distort the tenor of political
debates. 245 The Court found that this distortion rationale could not justify
restrictions on speech. The fact that individuals choose to use the corporate
form to amplify their message is inconsequential. 246 In debunking the anti-
distortion rationale the Court reasoned:
When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law,
to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted
237 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904-05.
238Id. at 898. ("If [BCRA] applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is merely
a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities
whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.").
239Id. at 899.
240 1d. at 900 ("Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the
discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment
seeks to foster." (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(plurality opinion)) (internal quotations omitted)).
241 Id. at 904 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).24 2 Cf Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 613, 636 (2006).24 3 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007). "[T]he First Amendment
has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office." Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm. 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
244 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990)).
24 5 See id.
24 6 See id at 911 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
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source he or she may hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is
unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for
ourselves. 247
The Court found that the narrow band of exceptions to this expansive view
of First Amendment protection were inapposite. These exceptions include
situations where the federal or state government is carrying out a basic service
such as operating a public school, a prison, or the military.248 For example, the
Court held that a student's suspension from school for making speech full of
sexual innuendos at a school assembly did not violate the First Amendment. 249
It also held that prison inmates do not have a First Amendment right to join
labor unions,250 and army physicians do not have a First Amendment right to
make public statements urging enlisted men to disobey orders and refuse to go
to Vietnam.251 The Court explained that unlike these cases, allowing corporate
independent expenditures would not interfere with basic government
functions.252 Similarly, allowing issuers to speak during the offering period
would not jeopardize essential government functions. The SEC as a regulator of
capital markets is a step removed from these functions-more like the FEC
regulating elections than like a state regulating a public school or prison.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed that corporate identity did not
justify restrictions on speech, but he rested his conclusion on textual grounds. 253
247 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. Another argument the government asserted to
justify the restriction was the dissenting shareholder rationale. See id. at 911. Under this
theory, the government argued that it should be allowed to limit political speech of
corporations in order to protect dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund
disagreeable speech. See id. The Court concluded that this rationale could not support the
speech restriction because harm to dissenting shareholders should be tempered by
procedures of "corporate democracy." Id. The last two arguments the government made
related to its ability to prevent the appearance of corruption and prevent foreigners from
influencing American elections. See id.
24 8 1d. at 899 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986);
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 759 (1974)).
249 1Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)) (protecting the
"function of public school education").
250 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (furthering
"the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system") (internal quotation marks
'omitted).
251 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (ensuring "the capacity of the Government
to discharge its [military] responsibilities" (quoting United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338,
343 (1972))).
252 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). By contrast, "it is inherent in the
nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse
sources in order to determine how to cast their votes." Id. at 899.
253 See id. at 929 (Scalia, J., concurring). "[T]he 'normal rule' is that 'partial, rather than
facial, invalidation is the required course,' such that a 'statute may . .. be declared invalid to
the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact." Id. at 932 (quoting Brokett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985) (alteration in original)).
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Justice Scalia found that any attempt to create a special category of corporate
persons for core First Amendment protections would be in clear derogation of
the text: "The [First] Amendment is written in terms of 'speech,' not speakers.
Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single
individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of
individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals . . . ."254
B. The Impact of Citizens United on Central Hudson and the Offering
Rules
At the very least, Citizens United suggests that the SEC may not prohibit
issuers from making public statements with political impact. However, Citizens
United may ultimately undermine Central Hudson for other speech as well,
because the thrust of the opinion is to reduce the disparity in treatment between
commercial and political speech.
To ensure a strict scrutiny review under the political speech doctrine, an
issuer like Groupon may insert a political message into its communication.
Doing so would change otherwise "commercial speech" into "political speech"
or "mixed speech." Given that the gun-jumping restrictions would likely not
survive scrutiny under the Central Hudson test, it certainly has little chance to
survive if challenged under the strict scrutiny standard of the political speech
doctrine as articulated by the Court in Citizens United.255 The Court stated
conclusively that "[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of. . . corporations." 256 Given this broad language, a court
would likely find that the gun-jumping restrictions affecting such a wide range
of speech, including truthful speech, are not narrowly tailored to achieve the
government's purposes of preventing fraud, increasing efficiency, and
increasing investor confidence. Further, less restrictive measures to the more
heavy-handed restrictions currently in place are available. 257
The publication and broadcast in Groupon would likely be characterized as
commercial speech as it relates to a transaction in securities and is similar to
advertisements for consumer products.258 In order to receive the heightened
protections afforded to political speech, Groupon could have used a different
tactic to enhance its public image during the offering period. For instance,
Groupon could have launched an advertising campaign taking a popular
254 Id at 929.2 55 See id at 903-05 (majority opinion).
256Id. at 913.
257 See supra Part III.A; see also Highberger, supra note 197, at 2170 (arguing that
mandatory disclaimers or warnings, in conjunction with existing anti-fraud provisions,
would be sufficient to protect the capital markets); Page, supra note 154, at 790 (suggesting
that adequate protection can be achieved through self-regulation or optional regulation
combined with market forces).2 58 See supra Part Ill.A.
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political stance-similar to Nike speaking out against sweatshop labor.259 Or
Groupon could have lauded its positive impact on the national economy by
promoting domestic business and encouraging consumers to do their part in
revitalizing the economy. This type of speech would probably be characterized
as "mixed speech" as it involves both a political and a commercial message.
Empirical evidence suggests that increased corporate political activity increases
firm performance and profits.260
Assuming Groupon increased its corporate political activity during the
offering period in violation of the offering rules, a strict scrutiny level of review
under Citizens United would apply, rather than a lesser standard under Central
Hudson. Under strict scrutiny, the government would have to demonstrate that
the offering restrictions "further[] a compelling interest and [are] narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest." 261 The SEC would likely be able to establish
that it has compelling interests in preventing fraud, protecting investors, and
improving market efficiency. However, the government would probably not be
able to set forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the prophylactic offering
rules which indiscriminately restrict truthful and misleading speech are
narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interests. As the government would
probably not be able to demonstrate a "reasonable fit" between the means and
the ends of the regulatory scheme under Central Hudson, it would be virtually
impossible to meet the higher "narrowly tailored" standard under Citizens
United. Further, there are several less restrictive means of achieving the
government's purposes of preventing fraud, improving market efficiency and
increasing investor confidence.
The restrictions placed on Groupon's communications during the offering
period may be subject to a strict scrutiny level of review even without the
insertion of a political message. Although directed at political speech, Citizens
United may ultimately result in the abandonment of the commercial speech
259 Another example of political speech is Toyota encouraging consumers to fight global
warming. See Keith Naughton, Toyota's Green Problem, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 10, 2007,
10:02 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/l1/10/toyota-s-green-problem.
html (describing a Toyota commercial: "Against a moody mountain backdrop, the Prius
slowly disintegrates back into the land, while an announcer says, 'Can a car company grow
in harmony with the environment? Why not? At Toyota, we're not only working toward cars
with zero emissions. We're also striving for zero waste in everything else we do."'); see also
Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1205, 1206-07 (2004) (discussing the difficulties in
drawing lines between political, commercial, and mixed speech).
260 See Sean Lux et al., Mixing Business with Politics: A Meta-analysis of the
Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Political Activity, 37 J. MGMT. 223, 239 (2011).
261 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007). "[T]he First Amendment
'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office." Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 165, 272 (1971)).
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doctrine as formulated by Central Hudson.262 Citizens United radically affirmed
the principle that the First Amendment must be neutral as between different
speakers, holding that even corporate speech (at least on political matters) is
fully protected by the First Amendment and cannot be subject to increased
regulation merely because of its corporate authorship. 263 Accordingly, the basis
for treating commercial speech differently must be its content, not its corporate
authorship. 264 Above all, the Court made clear that it takes seriously that the
First Amendment is meant to safeguard the "marketplace of ideas" with all its
free market connotations. 265 The Court also rejected as a basis for legislation
the notion that the government should address the market power of large
corporations within the "marketplace of ideas." 266
In the decade leading up to Citizens United some commentators had already
argued that the distinction between commercial speech and more protected
speech was becoming less important as the Supreme Court was becoming more
protective of commercial speech.267 In a series of commercial speech cases
related to liquor,268 gambling, 269 tobacco, 270 and prescription drugs, 271 the
Supreme Court found the speech limitations unconstitutional. The level of
review for commercial speech cases appears to have moved closer to strict
rather than intermediate scrutiny. 272
VI. REFINING THE QUIET PERIOD RESTRICTIONS AND SAFE HARBORS IN
LIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONAL, ECONOMIC, AND NORMATIVE CONCERNS
Quiet period regulations can be crafted to protect investors against false or
misleading statements while still respecting corporate speech rights and
efficiency in capital markets. One approach would be to narrow the definition of
262 See Darrel C. Menthe, The Marketplace Metaphor and Commercial Speech
Doctrine: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying About and Love Citizens United, 38
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 131, 132 (2010).
263 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
264 g.
26 5 See id. at 904-07, 914.26 61d at 899.
267 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some
Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REv 697, 732 (2003)
("[The Court] has been providing more and more protection [to commercial speech] since
the early 1990s."); Developments in the Law-Corporations and Society, 117 HARv. L. REv.
2169, 2272 (2004) ("[C]ommercial speech has enjoyed greater protection in recent
years.
268 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
269 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999).
270Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553 (2001).
271 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
272 See, e.g., Menthe, supra note 262, at 132; Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A
New Model for Commercial Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2836,
2853-56 (2005).
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the term "offer" in Section 5 of the Securities Act to permit communications
that may "condition the market" so long as those communications do not
propose a current exchange of securities. Although this measure may appear
radical at first glance, on deeper reflection it is a logical and reasonable
solution. Allowing a more open dialogue about the value of securities would not
only abate any free speech concerns, but would also increase market efficiency.
Investors would still be protected against false or misleading speech under the
anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act.
Less aggressive reforms that would still alleviate some free speech and
market efficiency concerns would expand the scope of some of the existing safe
harbors. For example, the safe harbor for EGCs to "test the water" under the
recently enacted JOBS Act could be expanded to allow all issuers to
communicate with potential investors to gauge interest in the offering. Also, the
safe harbor for ordinary business information for non-reporting companies
implemented as part of the 2005 Securities Offering Reform could be expanded
to allow forward-looking projections, similar to the safe harbor for reporting
companies.
A. Narrow Definition of Term "Offer"
The government has adopted so many variegated and complex exceptions to
the definition of the term "offer" in Section 5 of the Securities Act; it appears
that the exceptions may eventually swallow up the rule. 273 Rather than adopting
additional exemptions to the gun-jumping rules to reflect the realities of today's
marketplace and corporate free speech rights, the SEC could issue a release
narrowing the interpretation of the term "offer"274 for all eligible issuerS275 and
offering participants.
Currently the SEC interprets the term "offer" broadly to include any
communications that "condition the public mind or arouse public interest in the
particular securit[y]," 276 and then applies a host of exceptions. Instead, the SEC
could interpret the term "offer" narrowly to include only communications that
indicate a current intention to be bound. The SEC could adopt the common law
contract definition of "offer": "the manifestation of willingness to enter into a
273 See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes for a description of the 2005 Securities
Offering Reform and supra Part II.C for a description of the JOBS Act Reform.274 The Securities Act definition of an offer would not have to be revised as it defines an
offer as "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or
interest in a security, for value." Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3)
(2006).
275 Rule 405 sets forth circumstances under which an issuer will be deemed "ineligible,"
including issuers that within the past three years were a blank check or shell company or
issued a registered penny stock offering; issuers that violated the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws; and issuers that filed a bankruptcy petition (with certain exceptions).
Securities Act of 1933 Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2006).
276In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, 38 SEC
Docket 843, 850 (Feb. 9, 1959).
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bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to
that bargain is invited and will conclude it."277 Accordingly, a communication
would not violate the offering rules unless it proposed a current exchange in
securities.
Narrowing the definition of the term offer may appear to be a drastic
change to the offering rules. However, this change is something that has slowly
been occurring over the past decade through the adoption of several reforms to
the original offering rules. The 2005 Securities Offering Reforms, while
retaining the general structure of the offering rules, introduced several safe
harbors that allowed issuers and other offering participants to disseminate a
greater variety of information to investors. The SEC adopted safe harbors to
protect issuer and related party communications made more than 30 days before
the filing, releases of factual business information, the dissemination of free
writing prospectuses, and additional exceptions for certain classes of issuers.
Further, the JOBS Act recently created a safe harbor for EGCs to "test the
water" and solicit interest in the offering during the offering process. 278
These reforms, however, have not fully addressed the free speech and
efficiency concerns because many only apply to certain types of issuers, such as
WKSIs or EGCs but do not protect issuers in between.27 9 Those issuers with
annual gross revenues above $1 billion that are not WKSIs are still significantly
restricted in the types of communications they can make during the offering
process.
Another problem is that some of these safe harbors, such as the free writing
prospectus safe harbor, are convoluted and hard to understand.280 Accordingly,
even those issuers who are entitled to rely on the safe harbor may be reluctant to
do so because of the draconian consequences they may face if they are wrong in
their assessment of the applicable legal rules.281 The SEC may conclude that a
seemingly benign communication violated the Quiet Period Rules and order
rescission as a possible remedy to investors.282 Narrowing the definition of the
term "offer" would therefore have the added benefit of providing certainty for
issuers and other offering participants. Rather than maintaining convoluted
offering rules that eliminate the restrictions on certain types of speech for
certain types of issuers, the SEC could simplify matters and permit all
communications that do not propose a current exchange of securities during the
offering process.
Narrowing the definition of the term "offer" would also resolve the free
speech problems that the current rules raise. Restrictions limiting an offering
participant's ability to propose a current exchange of securities outside of the
statutory prospectus would likely pass muster under the Central Hudson test.
277 REsTATEmENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
278 See supra Part II.B-C for a description of these reforms.
279 See supra Part II.B-C.
280 See Davidoff, supra note 10.
281 See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2000).
282 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of remedies for gun-jumping violations.
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Such restrictions would directly and materially advance the government's
interests in preventing fraud and increasing investor confidence in capital
markets. Further, the government should be able to demonstrate a reasonable fit
between the narrow restrictions and its interests. Unlike defending the broad
prophylactic constraints on speech, the SEC would be able to defend the more
narrow restrictions as a necessary means of accomplishing its objectives.
Adopting narrow constraints on speech would demonstrate that the SEC
"'carefully calculat[ed] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on
speech imposed' by the regulations." 283
The prohibition on proposing a current exchange of securities outside of the
statutory prospectus may also pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard
articulated in Citizens United.284 The government may be able to set forth
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the restriction on speech is narrowly
tailored to achieve its compelling interests. There do not appear to be any less
restrictive means of achieving the government's purpose of preventing fraud,
improving market efficiency and increasing investor confidence. Accordingly,
narrowing the definition of offer and prohibiting offers during the quiet period
would be consistent with Central Hudson and Citizens United.
Some may be concerned that if the rules were liberalized to broaden the
definition of the term "offer" issuers and other offering participants may release
false or misleading information. Several safeguards are available to temper this
concern. Most importantly, speakers would still be liable under the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws for the contents of their communications. 2 85
Under these provisions, an issuer or other offering participant would be civilly
and criminally liable for false or misleading statements made during the
offering period. Accordingly, broadening the definition of the term "offer"
would only provide incentives for issuers or underwriters to release accurate,
non-misleading information whose accuracy would be easy to establish in any
subsequent litigation.
Moreover, even if an issuer were to release misleading statements or
statements of mere puffery, investors would be protected as research analysts
and various news outlets would be available to pick apart these statements. 286
This open dialogue between issuers, underwriters and analysts would actually
increase market efficiency, as this additional public information would be
incorporated into the price of the securities. Further, sophisticated investors
would appropriately discount any statements that would be deemed mere
puffery. As sophisticated investors help set the price for securities, retail
investors would also be protected against the statement's distorting effect.
283 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (quoting City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993)).
284 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
285 See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, and 77q
(2006).
286 See supra Part 1I.B.
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In sum, narrowing the definition of the term "offer" to allow additional
communications during the offering process would be the most effective way to
resolve the free speech and market efficiency concerns. There are sufficient
protective measures in place to temper the ability of issuers to distort the true
value of the securities by releasing false or misleading information. However, if
the SEC is reluctant to make this type of change, other reforms would also serve
to ameliorate the constitutional and efficiency concerns.
B. Expand Permissible Communications Between Issuers and
Prospective Investors
As an alternative, the SEC could revise the current offering rules to permit
issuers and related parties to "test the water" to gauge interest among
prospective investors, during the registration process. 287 Congress and the SEC
have already enacted legislation and adopted rules permitting certain classes of
issuers to make these types of communications to certain classes of investors.
For example, the JOBS Act recently created an exception to the offering rules to
allow EGCs to "test the water" prior to or following the filing of a registration
statement. Specifically, EGCs or persons acting on their behalf, including
underwriters, are permitted to communicate orally or in writing to QIBs or
accredited investors, "to determine whether such investors might have an
interest in a contemplated securities offering," without violating the quiet period
restrictions. 288
The 2005 Securities Offering Reforms include a similar exception for
WKSIs. Rule 163 of the Securities Act permits WKSIs to engage in unrestricted
oral and written offers for their securities during the pre-filing period without
violating the gun-jumping provisions of the Securities Act.289 The SEC has
recognized, in proposing amendments to Securities Act Rule 163, that
additional accommodations are necessary to allow WKSIs acting through
underwriters, to "assess the level of investor interest in their securities before
filing a registration statement." 290
2 8 7 IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES
AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 28 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuildingthe ipo on-ramp.pdf.288 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong., § 105(d) (2012),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.
pdf.
289 See Securities Act of 1933 Rule 163, 17 C.F.R. § 230.163 (2006). In order to rely on
this exception, certain conditions must be met, including that: (1) all communications made
by or on behalf of the issuer would continue to be subject to Regulation FD; (2) every
written communication that is an offer made in reliance on the exemption would contain
substantially the legend required by the rule; and (3) every written communication that is an
offer made in reliance on the exemption would be filed with the Commission as a free
writing prospectus when the registration statement is filed. See id.
290 Revisions to Rule 163, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,545, 68,546 (Dec. 28, 2009) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230) (proposing to amend Securities Act Rule 163 to allow underwriters,
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These exceptions currently available only to EGCs or WKSIs could be
expanded to permit all issuers and offering participants to communicate with
potential investors to gauge interest in the offering during the registration
process. The JOBS Act and 2005 Securities Offering Reforms created the
exception for EGCs and WKSIs to help these businesses raise capital. There
seems little reason not to assist companies which have more than $1 billion in
annual gross revenues but are not WKSIs to also raise capital.
Allowing all issuers to communicate more openly with potential
sophisticated investors would increase market efficiency. Meetings between
investors and management at an early stage in the offering process would allow
investors to be better prepared to make investment decisions at the time of the
IPO. "The limited context of a formal road show presentation" makes "it more
difficult for some investors to engage in a meaningful deliberative process,
particularly for the type of long-term investors whose participation is most
desirable to IPO issuers."291 "Moreover, investors have repeatedly asked for
more contact with management during the marketing process." 292
This reform would not entirely resolve the free speech problems created by
the offering rules, as significant speech restraints would remain. However,
permitting additional communications between offering participants and
potential investors would demonstrate that the SEC is attempting to find "a
reasonable fit between the means and the ends" of promoting investor
confidence, preventing fraud, and increasing market efficiency under the
Central Hudson test.293 Further, expanding the safe harbor would signal that the
SEC is trying to "narrowly tailor" its restrictions to achieve its compelling
interest as required under Citizens United.294
Some skeptics may be concerned that issuers or underwriters would
disseminate false or misleading statements during these meetings. However,
speakers have an incentive to only disclose accurate, non-misleading
information because "test the water" communications will be subject to anti-
fraud provisions under the federal securities laws. 295 Further, sophisticated
investors would be capable of appropriately discounting any puffery or
misleading statements.
acting on behalf of "well-known seasoned issuer[s]," to offer securities before filing a
registration statement to gauge investor interest without requiring public disclosure of an
intent to conduct an offering, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,545).
291 IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 287, at 29 (recommending expanded road shows, but
only for accredited investors or qualified institutional buyers).
292 Id
293 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
294 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
295 See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, and 77q
(2006).
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C. Revise Ordinary Business Communications Safe Harbor to Include
Forward-Looking Information for Non-Reporting Issuers
In 2005, the SEC adopted a safe harbor for non-reporting companies to
continue to release ordinary-course information during the registration process
without violating the offering rules.296 Although expanded use of safe harbors
may be less attractive than more global revisions of the Quiet Period Rules, the
2005 safe harbor could be expanded to permit the release of forward-looking
information including forecasts, projections, and predictions relating to the
company's financial performance or its value. Allowing forward-looking
projections of growth, revenues, and profits would increase market efficiency as
it would allow sophisticated investors and other intermediaries who act to
"filter" the information to less sophisticated investors to more accurately predict
the value of an IPO. 297 Sophisticated investors would be capable of discounting
the risks inherent in relying on forward-looking information and would place
greater weight on more reliable information contained in the statutory
prospectus.
Further, the release of this information would prompt additional reports by
analysts, reporters and others who would have the opportunity to debate the
value of the assertions the company makes. Analysts and reporters have little
reason to prepare reports on non-reporting companies when the only
information they can respond to is that contained in the statutory prospectus. 298
According to the ECMH this additional information from issuers, underwriters
and analysts would quickly be incorporated into the price of the securities
making the price more accurate.
The SEC would likely contend that unlike reporting companies, non-
reporting companies should not be permitted to disseminate forward-looking
information because of the lack of publicly available information or history for
these companies.299 As the SEC explained when adopting the 2005 Reforms,
"the potential for abuse in permitting a safe harbor for the continued release of
forward-looking information as a way to condition the market for the issuer's
296 Securities Act of 1933 Rule 169, 17 C.F.R. § 230.169 (2006).297 See generally HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION
IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 104-05 (1979); Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some
Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151, 1164-70 (1970). This filtering process
is sometimes flawed as indicated by the recent lawsuits against several underwriters of the
Facebook Inc. IPO, including Morgan Stanley. Stempel & Levine, supra note 102. The
shareholders alleged that research analysts had lowered their business forecasts for Facebook
during the IPO process, but that these changes were selectively disclosed by defendants to
certain "preferred investors" rather than to the public generally. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, Regulation FD was implemented to remedy this type of unjust
distribution of information.298 See supra text accompanying notes 117-23.299 See Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392, 67,404 (proposed Nov. 17,
2004).
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securities outweighs the legitimate utility to the issuer of the safe harbor."300
However, the SEC did not detail how it determined that "potential for abuse" or
how it weighed the risks of such abuse against the loss to investors of depriving
them of this forward-looking information.301 Investors would likely value
forward-looking projections and other information from non-reporting
companies without a large analyst following.302 Without such information
provided by issuers, "investors may turn to chat rooms and Internet message
boards to fill the information void for forward-looking information." 303
Information from these sources is inherently less reliable than information that
an issuer or other offering participant would release and is unlikely to be filtered
by analysts. Also, if the SEC is concerned about verifying the accuracy of
projections, it could require underwriters, accountants, bankers, lawyers, or
even insurers to monitor or vouch for the company's public statements. 304
Further, issuers and underwriters have an incentive not to overprice the
offering based on puffery. First, if underwriters set the offer price too high
based on overly optimistic forecasts, sophisticated investors would refrain from
purchasing securities and issuers or underwriters would be stuck with unsold
shares. Second, underwriters are concerned with preserving its reputational
capital, particularly in IPO markets where there is often an opportunity for
follow-on offerings. Finally, a large gap in IPO price and secondary trading
price may reflect some false or misleading statements and possible rescission as
a remedy for such violations.
Given the safeguards to both prevent issuers or underwriters from releasing
overly optimistic forecasts and to protect investors from being unduly
influenced by positive forecasts, the safe harbor should be expanded. Allowing
the dissemination of forward-looking statements would show that the SEC is
attempting to find a reasonable fit between the offering restrictions and its
legitimate goals of preventing fraud and increasing investor confidence as
required by Central Hudson.
In accord with the SEC's stated objectives, these suggested reforms would
better strike "the appropriate balance between improving the capital formation
process and modernizing offering communications, while preserving investor
300Id.
301 See id
302 See Fisch, supra note 94, at 70 (linking the dramatic growth in Internet securities
fraud to the increased investor reliance on chat rooms and other Internet sources).303 Choi, supra note 60, at 112.304 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial
Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REv. 413, 427 (2004)
(suggesting that "[fjinancial statement insurance can be created as an optional alternative to
traditional financial statement auditing"); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability ofProfessional
Firms After Enron, 29 J. CORP. L. 427, 440 (2004) ("Professional firms' reputations can
bond their promises ... to monitor clients on behalf of investors and others. Large
professional firms in effect rent their reputations to their clients . . . .").
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protection and avoiding unnecessary impediments to the capital formation
process." 305
VII. CONCLUSION
The Quiet Period Rules, which served a legitimate purpose when originally
adopted in the 1930s, pose significant economic, normative and constitutional
law problems. Despite several recent reforms attempting to liberalize the
antiquated rules, the current regime continues to plague non-reporting
companies launching public offerings as demonstrated by the Groupon and
Facebook IPOs. During the offering process, issuer and related party
communications must take care not to mention the proposed offering, include
opinions about the value of the company, or include forward-looking
statements, projections, or forecasts. These types of communications could be
interpreted as gun-jumping violations even if the disclosures are entirely
truthful and accurate.
The theory behind restricting both accurate and misleading speech is that
investors should make investment decisions based on the carefully calibrated
disclosures contained in the statutory prospectus, rather than on the positive
information disseminated by the company that has not been reviewed by the
SEC. However, given today's technology, the release of positive information
from issuers or underwriters would prompt a plethora of analysts and news
outlets to issue their own reports confirming or disputing the information.
According to the ECMH sophisticated investors would quickly assimilate the
additional information into the price of the securities. Irrational investors who
are not capable of adequately discounting information would also be protected
through this price mechanism. Accordingly, the Quiet Period Rules which
indiscriminately exclude information results in market inefficiencies and
ultimately harms all investors.
Further, the offering rules which restrict the disclosure of truthful non-
misleading speech for the purpose of protecting those that would hear the
speech are unlikely to survive a First Amendment challenge. The expansion of
the commercial speech doctrine over the past few decades, combined with the
robust articulation of corporate political speech rights in the recent Citizens
United case makes it increasingly likely that such a challenge will be brought.
The time is therefore ripe for the SEC to consider liberalizing the offering rules.
Offering rules can be crafted to protect investors against false or misleading
305 Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,724 (Aug. 3, 2005).
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statements while still respecting corporate speech rights and efficiency in
capital markets.

